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Abstract
Computational advertising is an emerging scientific discipline that incorporates tools
and ideas from fields such as statistics, computer science, and economics. Although a
consequence of the rapid growth of the Internet, computational advertising has since
helped transform the online advertising business into a multi-billion dollar industry.
The fundamental goal of computational advertising is to determine the “best”
online ad to display to any given user. This “best” ad, however, changes depending
upon the specific context that is under consideration. This leads to a variety of
different problems, three of which are discussed in this thesis.
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the topics of online advertising and computational
advertising. Chapter 2 proposes a numerical method to approximate the pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium bidding functions in an independent private value first-price
sealed-bid auction where bidders draw their types from continuous and atomless
distributions—a setting in which solutions cannot generally be analytically derived,
despite the fact that they are known to exist and to be unique. Chapter 3 pro-
poses a cross-domain recommender system that is a multiple-domain extension of
the Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization model. Chapter 4 discuss some of
the tools and challenges of text mining by using the Trayvon Martin shooting incident
as a case study in analyzing the lexical content and network connectivity structure
of the political blogosphere. Finally, Chapter 5 presents some concluding remarks
and briefly discusses other problems in computational advertising.
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1Introduction
In online advertising, advertisers use the Internet to distribute promotional market-
ing messages to consumers. Already a multi-billion dollar business, this industry
continues to rapidly grow and evolve as new technologies emerge and develop.
Of course, this growth has only been possible because advertisers have found the
Internet to be an extremely effective medium for delivering their ads. In particular,
online ads have proven to be considerably cheaper and more targetable than their
offline counterparts (e.g., print and television ads). Coupled with the global mar-
ket coverage and speed at which online ads can be deployed, advertisers have been
quick to adopt the Internet as a premiere marketing platform. Furthermore, due to
the immediate feedback mechanisms that exist (e.g., clicks and conversions), online
ads have also made it easier for advertisers to directly evaluate and improve their
advertising efforts.
Although they lie at the other end of the industry, web publishers have also played
a key role in the rise of online advertising. Most notably, publishers have become the
content producers of the Internet, and they provide the web properties that allow
advertisers to reach consumers. In return, publishers have been able to secure a
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revenue stream for themselves that was unimaginable just over a decade ago.
Web users have also benefited enormously from the success of online advertising.
Exposure to relevant Internet ads has made users more intelligent consumers who are
more aware of their purchasing options. Furthermore, much of the web content that
users enjoy is only available because potential ad revenue incentivizes publishers
to produce it. Similarly, many of the free services that users regularly use (e.g.,
search engines, email, and social media platforms) are only possible because they are
supported by advertising revenue.
Perhaps the largest stakeholders in this industry, however, are the companies such
as Google, Yahoo!, and Facebook that are actively involved in all facets of the online
advertising process. In addition to operating the major ad exchanges that facilitate
the buying and selling of online ads, these companies also function as publishers
who provide advertisers with highly unique advertising opportunities such as spon-
sored search ads and social media marketing. Furthermore, these companies often
offer tools that either help advertisers increase the effectiveness of their advertising
campaigns, or help publishers improve the performance of ads on their websites.
The development of these tools has helped lead to the emergence of computa-
tional advertising—a new scientific discipline that incorporates techniques and ideas
from fields such as statistics, computer science, and economics. Consequently, the
fundamental goal of computational advertising is to determine the “best” online ad
to display to any given user. This “best” ad, however, changes depending upon
the specific context that is under consideration. This leads to a variety of different
problems, three of which are discussed in this thesis.
Chapter 2 covers the topic of auctions, which is the mechanism that ad exchanges
use to buy and sell online advertisements. In this chapter, we propose the Backwards
Indifference Derivation (BID) algorithm to numerically approximate the pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium bidding functions in an independent private value first-price
2
sealed-bid auction where bidders draw their types from continuous and atomless
distributions—a setting in which solutions cannot generally be analytically derived,
despite the fact that they are known to exist and to be unique. The BID algorithm is
motivated in part by the results derived in Athey (2001), and attempts to construct
a sequence of finite-action equilibria that converges to the continuum-action solu-
tion. Consequently, our approach differs from other numerical methods that directly
consider a system of poorly behaved differential equations. We then evaluate the
performance of the BID algorithm using numerical examples—including situations
that other numerical algorithms have not yet considered or are unable to handle—
and our results show that it produces solutions that are consistent with economic
theory. Finally, we use the BID algorithm to investigate the area of auction design,
which can provide insights into how ad auctions can be modified in order to generate
more revenue.
Chapter 3 focuses on the area of recommender systems, which are a class of models
that attempt to predict how a user will respond to an item. Consequently, recom-
mender systems are particularly important in the field of computational advertising
because they can help to identify the most cost-effective ad to display to the user.
Traditionally, research in this space has focused on models that make recommenda-
tions within a single domain (e.g., movies or music). Oftentimes, however, advertisers
would like to make recommendations that span multiple-domains. In these situations,
recommendations in one domain can potentially be improved by leveraging knowl-
edge from other domains—a concept that has motivated the recent development of
cross-domain recommender systems. In this chapter we propose a cross-domain rec-
ommender system that is a multiple-domain extension of the Bayesian Probabilistic
Matrix Factorization model proposed by Salakhutdinov and Mnih (2008b). We then
provide experimental results showing that our proposed model outperforms other
similar models in two different cross-domain recommendation situations.
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In Chapter 4, we discuss some of the tools and challenges of text mining by
using the Trayvon Martin shooting incident as a case study in analyzing the lexical
content and network connectivity structure of the political blogosphere. Although
the event and the set of websites that we investigate are not necessarily aligned
with computational advertising, the tools that we use can be applied more broadly
in order to better understand consumer preferences and track how online content
evolves over time. Indeed, a growing front in computational advertising seeks to use
text mining and network analysis to help select relevant online ads.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents some concluding remarks and briefly discusses other
problems in computational advertising.
4
2Auctions: The Backwards Indifference Derivation
(BID) Algorithm
2.1 Introduction
Auctions have a long and rich history of being used as a market mechanism to buy
and sell goods or services. In turn, the diverse range of circumstances in which auc-
tions have been held has helped to shape the field of auction theory by introducing
new auction formats into the literature. Even today, the field is undergoing a trans-
formation: due to the rapid growth of the Internet, countless auctions are being held
every second in a new online ad exchange environment where advertisers compete
for the right to display their Internet ads to users.
Despite how far auction theory has progressed, however, one aspect of the in-
dependent private value first-price sealed-bid auction is still not well understood.
Specifically, although it is known that the continuous pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium (PSNE) bidding functions for this auction format exist and are unique when
bidders draw their valuations (types) from different continuous and atomless distri-
butions, in general these strategies cannot be analytically derived. Consequently,
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much research has been focused on developing numerical algorithms to approximate
these PSNE solutions. To date, however, no method has yet been able to establish
that it converges to the solution.
In this chapter we propose the Backwards Indifference Derivation (BID) algo-
rithm, which is a backwards-shooting algorithm that is motivated in part by the
results derived in Athey (2001). Specifically, the BID algorithm attempts to ap-
proximate the continuous PSNE solution through a sequence of finite-action PSNE
that are constructed by finding where bidders are “indifferent” between two different
actions. Consequently, our approach differs from other popular numerical methods
that directly consider a system of poorly behaved differential equations.
Like all of the numerical methods that have been proposed to date, we evaluate
the performance of the BID algorithm through the use of numerical examples. We
first consider situations where the PSNE solution cannot be analytically derived, and
show that our algorithm passes a necessary visual “test” that was recently proposed
by Hubbard et al. (2013)—suggesting that our algorithm produces results that are
consistent with economic theory. Afterwards, we investigate examples with known
closed-form solutions and show that the BID algorithm is capable of handling other
kinds of auction asymmetries that are not typically considered by other numerical
methods—such as differences in the supports of the type distributions and asymme-
tries in the bidders’ utility functions. Finally, we use the BID algorithm analyze how
ad auctions can be modified in order to generate more revenue.
2.2 Standard Model: Theory and Notation
Suppose that there are N bidders participating in an auction for a single object,
where the bidders belong to the set N  t1, 2, ..., Nu and the letter n is used to
index the members. We focus on independent private value first-price sealed-bid
auctions, where the conditions imply the following:
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• Independent Private Value: Each bidder only knows his own valuation for
the object, and this valuation is not influenced by the other bidders.
• First-Price: The highest bidder wins the object and pays the amount that he
bids. Losing bidders are no better or worse off.
• Sealed-Bid: Bids are submitted simultaneously so that no bidder knows the
bid of any other participant.
The nth bidder has a private valuation for the object being bid on, which is
modeled as a random variable Vn that is independently drawn from his own type
distribution Fnpvnq. For all n, these distributions Fn are assumed to be continuous
with strictly positive densities fnpvnq  F 1npvnq ¡ 0 on their supports Tn  rvn, v¯ns 
R, where vn ¥ 0. Although these distributions Fn are common knowledge, the actual
realizations vn for the valuations are private and known only to bidder n himself.
In the literature, a common and compact support for all of the bidders is usually
assumed: Tn  rv, v¯s for all n. For the remainder of this section we adopt this
assumption as we develop the standard model. However, we relax this assumption
in later sections when we discuss results from Athey (2001) and introduce our own
algorithm. Consequently, our algorithm is able to consider situations that have
typically been ignored in the auction literature.
At this point, it is helpful to define some additional notation that will allow
us to succinctly refer to certain groups of the bidders. We use bolded font with-
out a subscript to denote the N -tuple collecting all N bidders: for example F 
pF1, F2, ..., FNq to denote all N type distributions. Meanwhile, (N1)-tuples that
collect all bidders except one are denoted with an additional subscript that indicates
which bidder has been excluded: for example Fn  pF1, F2, ..., Fn1, Fn 1, ..., FNq
to denote everyone’s type distribution except bidder n.
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Using this notation, we now formally define a PSNE solution. The goal of the
analysis is to determine each bidder’s PSNE bidding function βnpvnq that prescribes
his best response bid bn as a function of his type vn. More specifically, the bidding
function βn is bidder n’s best response to βn if, for all his types vn P Tn, βn
maximizes his expected utility given that the other bidders are using the bid functions
βn and that their valuations are drawn according to Fn. A PSNE is then defined
as an N -tuple of bidding functions β such that for all n, βn is a best response function
to every other strategy in the collection βn.
These PSNE bidding functions are known to be nondecreasing in the sense that
higher types place (nonstrictly) higher bids. We restrict our attention to situations
where the range for the PSNE functions is identical for all bidders rb, b¯s.1 If the
auctioneer does not set a reserve price r, or if r ¤ v, then the lower bound b  v. In
the presence of a reserve price r such that v   r   v¯, then the lower bound b  r.
A reserve price r ¥ v¯ leads to a trivial solution where no bidders participate in the
auction.
Boundary conditions are also imposed on the PSNE bidding functions. The lower,
left-boundary condition is given by βnpbq  b for all n. The upper, right-boundary
condition is given by βnpv¯q  b¯ for all n. Meanwhile, all types vn   b will choose
not to participate in the auction as they would receive a negative utility should they
actually win. Notice that these boundary conditions highlight one other aspect of
the problem. Regardless of the presence of a reserve price, the lower boundary b is
always known ahead of time. The upper boundary b¯, on the other hand, is always a
priori unknown and must be found.
We will also need to consider the inverse PSNE bidding functions for the bidders,
which are functions that map bids back to the types that placed them. We will
1 We continue to maintain this assumption when we move to the case of different supports for the
type distributions.
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denote these functions as φnpbnq. Observe that the boundary conditions imposed on
the PSNE bidding functions βn imply the following boundary conditions on these
inverse functions: φnpbq  b and φnpb¯q  v¯ for all n.
Another standard assumption in the literature is that all bidders are risk neutral.2
Therefore, bidder n receives the following payoff when his type is vn and he submits
bid bn:
Unpvn, bq 
"
vn  bn if bn ¡ bm for all n  m
0 otherwise.
That is, bidder n receives a utility of vn  bn if he wins the auction by outbidding
every other bidder with a bid of bn, and he receives a utility of 0 if at least one other
bidder outbids him.
Meanwhile, the probability that bidder n wins the auction with a bid of bn is
equal to the probability that every other bidder bids below bn. This is given by:
Prpbn wins auctionq  PrpB1   bn, B2   bn, ..., Bn1   bn, Bn 1   bn, ..., BN   bnq

¹
mn
PrpBm   bnq

¹
mn
PrpβmpVmq   bnq

¹
mn
PrpVm   φmpbnqq

¹
mn
Fmpφmpbnqq. (2.1)
Consequently, if bidder n’s type is vn, then he wants to submit the bid bn that
maximizes his expected utility:
max
bn
EUnpvn, bnq  max
bn
#
pvn  bnq
¹
mn
Fmpφmpbnqq
+
. (2.2)
2 Later on we will relax this assumption and consider asymmetries in the utility functions.
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2.2.1 Symmetric Auctions
In the case of symmetric auctions, all bidders draw their types from the same dis-
tribution (i.e., Fnpvnq  F pvq for all n) and have identical PSNE functions (i.e.,
βnpvnq  βpvq and φnpvnq  φpvq for all n). Therefore, when considering symmetric
auctions we can drop all of the subscripts in equation (2.2). Furthermore, equation
(2.1), which gave the probability of bidder n winning the auction with a bid of bn,
is now equal to rF pφpbqqsN1 in a symmetric auction. Consequently, the expected
maximization problem reduces to:
max
b
EUpv, bq  max
b
!
pv  bq rF pφpbqqsN1
)
.
Following Hubbard and Paarsch (2014), we obtain the following first order condition
by differentiating with respect to b:
pv  bqpN  1q rF pφpbqqsN2 fpφpbqqφ1pbq  rF pφpbqqsN1  0.
Next recall that φ and β are inverse functions of each other. Therefore, in equilibrium
we know that φpbq  v ðñ βpvq  b and that φ1pbq  1
β1pvq
. Using these facts, we
arrive at:
β1pvq   βpvqpN  1qfpvq
F pvq 
pN  1qvfpvq
F pvq .
Notice that the above equation is a linear, first-order differential equation of the
form dy
dx
  yppxq  qpxq that can be solved analytically. Using the initial boundary
condition βpvq  b, the unique symmetric PSNE solution can be derived as:
βpvq  v 
» v
b
F pv˜qN1dv˜
F pvqN1 . (2.3)
Consequently, we see that the symmetric auction problem has a closed-form PSNE
solution. The following example illustrates a simple symmetric auction situation.
10
Example 1
Suppose that we have two symmetric bidders whose valuations are independent ran-
dom variables drawn uniformly between 0 and 1. That is, F pvq  v where v P r0, 1s.
Furthermore assume that there is no reserve price, which implies that the left bound-
ary condition on the PSNE bidding functions is given by b  0.
Because the two bidders are symmetric, we know that they have identical PSNE
bidding functions. In particular, using (2.3) we know that the PSNE solution is given
by:
βpvq  v 
» v
0
v˜dv˜
v
 v 
v2
2
v
 v  v
2
 v
2
.
Therefore, the PSNE solution for each bidder is to bid exactly half of their valuation
for the object. For example, suppose that bidder 1’s type happened to be 1
2
and
bidder 2’s type happened to be 4
5
. Then in a PSNE, bidder 1 will place a bid of 1
4
while bidder 2 places a bid of 2
5
. Consequently, bidder 2 ends up winning the auction
and receives a utility of 2
5
. Meanwhile, bidder 1 receives a utility of 0.
2.2.2 Asymmetric Auctions
In the case of asymmetric auctions, however, equation (2.2) cannot be reduced fur-
ther. From Hubbard and Paarsch (2014), we see that differentiating it with respect
to bn results in the following set of first order conditions for bidders n  1, ..., N :
φ1npbq 
Fnpφnpbqq
fnpφnpbqq
#
1
N  1
N¸
m1
1
φmpbq  b
ff
 1
φnpbq  b
+
, (2.4)
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with boundary conditions φnpbq  b and φnpb¯q  b¯ for all n. Unfortunately, unlike the
symmetric case, this system of differential equations cannot be simplified any further.
Furthermore, observe that the boundary conditions themselves are problematic: the
upper boundary b¯ is a priori unknown while the lower boundary b  b, although
known, does not satisfy a Lipschitz continuity condition—resulting in an extremely
difficult problem to solve.
Intuitively, a Lipschitz continuous function g : Rd Ñ Rd is limited in how quickly
it can change. Mathematically, we can state this as follows: for every pair of points
x and y of this function g, there exists some real number K ¡ 0 (which is called a
“Lipschitz constant”) such that
}gpyq  gpxq}
}y  x} ¤ K,
where }} is a given vector norm.
Returning to the case of asymmetric auctions, recall that the lower boundary
condition is given by φnpbq  b for all n. Therefore, it can be observed that the
system of differential equations given in (2.4) no longer satisfies a Lipschitz condition
because some of the denominators vanish at bn  b. Consequently, much of the
standard theory regarding systems of ordinary differential equations is no longer
applicable.
Despite these mathematical difficulties, several important theoretical results have
still been proven for asymmetric auctions—most notably that the PSNE solutions
exist and are unique. As pointed out in Athey (2001), these proofs have generally
followed one of two main approaches:
1. Establishing that a unique solution exists to the system of differential equations
given in (2.4) via indirect proofs (Lebrun, 1999; Bajari, 2001).
2. Showing that an equilibrium exists when either types or actions are restricted
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to finite sets, and then appealing to limiting arguments (Lebrun, 1996; Maskin
and Riley, 2000; Athey, 2001; Jackson and Swinkels, 2005).
Even with these important theoretical results of existence and uniqueness, how-
ever, in general there is no closed-form solution to the asymmetric auction problem.
Therefore, in parallel to these efforts, much research attention has been focused on
developing numerical methods to approximate these asymmetric PSNE solutions.
As noted by Hubbard and Paarsch (2014), the development of these numerical
algorithms is particularly important because they can help in the advancement and
understanding of economic theory, empirical analysis, and policy evaluation. For
example, asymmetries in the type distributions violates one of the conditions of the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which holds that many types of auctions (e.g., first-
price, second-price, all pay) generate the same expected revenue for the auctioneer.
However, the actual consequences that may occur under these asymmetries are not
yet completely well understood, and numerical investigation may help to provide
some clues, intuition, or answers.
We discuss some of the most widely used numerical methods in more detail in
the next section.
2.3 Numerical Methods
In this section, we briefly review some of the most popular numerical methods that
have been used to investigate the asymmetric auction problem that we are consid-
ering. These algorithms typically follow one of three strategies: backwards-shooting
algorithms, transformation methods, and projection methods. Despite their differ-
ences, as Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) recently noted, they all still have something
in common: none of them have yet established that they converge to the truth. This
may not be too surprising given that all of these numerical methods consider the
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poorly behaved system of differential equations in (2.4). For a more thorough and
comprehensive overview of numerical methods, see Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) or
the actual papers themselves.
Marshall et al. (1994) pioneered research in this area by being the first to pro-
pose using numerical algorithms to approximate the PSNE functions for asymmetric
auctions. In their paper, all bidders draw their types from the standard uniform
distribution, with the asymmetries in the auction arising when bidders collude to
form two coalitions of different sizes—a setup that can be shown to be equivalent
to an asymmetric auction where two bidders draw their valuations from different
power distributions. To try to solve the system of differential equations in (2.4)
while avoiding the “nuisance” solutions resulting from the singularity at the lower
boundary, the authors proposed a backwards-shooting method.
Recall that the system of differential equations for asymmetric auctions in equa-
tion 2.4 is a two-point boundary value problem where the lower boundary point b is
known, but the upper boundary point b¯ is a priori unknown. A backwards-shooting
algorithm attempts to solve this type of problem by treating it as an initial value
problem. Intuitively, this is done by first fixing the a priori unknown right boundary
b¯ at some initial value (i.e., a guess). Using this fixed initial guess for the maximal
bid, the differential equation in (2.4) is then solved backwards using some numerical
method (e.g., Euler’s method or Runge-Kutta). The validity of the solution that is
obtained is then checked by determining whether it satisfies the known lower bound-
ary condition φnpbq  b for all n. Finally, depending on the results of this check, the
initial guess for b¯ is adjusted so that successive approximations are more accurate.
In a later section, we discuss how these adjustments to b¯ are made in the context of
asymmetric auctions.
The specific numerical routine used for the backwards-shooting method in Mar-
shall et al. (1994) is a recursive pth order Taylor series expansion that runs backwards
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along a set of equally spaced grid points in rb, b¯s, where b¯ has been fixed at some
initial guess as was discussed in the previous paragraph.
Although the examples presented by Marshall et al. are rather simplistic by
today’s standards, their research has motivated many recent developments in the
backwards-shooting literature. Indeed, backwards-shooting methods have been the
most researched and most widely used numerical algorithms to date. For example,
Bajari (2001) and Li and Riley (2007) showed how the behavior of a given back-
wards solution with respect to the known lower boundary b can be used to adjust
the initial guess of the a priori unknown upper boundary b¯ via a bisection method.
Li and Riley also proposed using the Bulirsch-Stoer routine as a more accurate and
efficient way of evaluating the system of differential equations. Meanwhile, Gayle and
Richard (2008) extended backwards-shooting algorithms to N asymmetric bidders
whose type distributions belong to one of four families (the two parameter Weibull,
beta, normal, and lognormal), and they introduced a novel search algorithm to find
the unknown upper boundary b¯.
Despite the popularity of backwards-shooting methods, however, many authors
have noted a numerical instability in their algorithms existing near the left boundary
condition βnpvnq  b for all n. These observations were recently formalized by
Fibich and Gavish (2011), who showed that all backwards-shooting algorithms are
inherently unstable for solving asymmetric auctions problems.
Specifically, Fibich and Gavish noted that the upper boundary b¯—even if known
or computed exactly (e.g, in the case of symmetric auctions)—can only be numeri-
cally approximated to some order of accuracy due to machine round-off error. They
denote this computer representation of the maximal bid as b¯  b¯   for some error
  0. The authors then showed that using b¯ as the initial right boundary condition
for backwards-shooting instead of the true b¯ leads to inherently unstable solutions.
Furthermore, this instability worsens as the number of bidders increases. Therefore,
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the instability that many authors had observed was not simply a “technical issue”
of any single backwards-shooting method, but instead an “inherent analytic prop-
erty of backwards solutions” that “cannot be eliminated by changing the numerical
methodology for backwards integration.”
Consequently, Fibich and Gavish proposed a new approach that transforms the
system of differential equations in (2.4) to use one of the bidder’s types vn as the
independent variable instead of b. This transformed system then lies on a fixed
known domain (i.e., the support for one of the type distributions), and it has slightly
different boundary conditions. More importantly, this transformation allowed Fibich
and Gavish to avoid the instability that inherently characterizes backwards-shooting
algorithms. The authors then used fixed-point iterations and Newton’s iterations to
solve this transformed system.
Nevertheless, Fibich and Gavish noted that their proposed method is not without
its own shortcomings: more “research is needed to eliminate the ad-hoc choice of the
independent variable,” as the “wrong choice of the independent variable may lead
to divergence.” This behavior can even occur in the relatively simple examples that
backwards-shooting methods appear to routinely handle.3
Projection methods are the final numerical technique commonly used to approx-
imate asymmetric auction PSNE solutions. This approach attempts to use a finite
linear combination of simpler, known basis functions to approximate a more complex,
unknown function. Bajari (2001) proposed an algorithm using polynomials as these
basis functions. Meanwhile, Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) modified Bajari’s algo-
rithm to instead use Chebyshev polynomials. Furthermore, they recast the problem
within the Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) approach
advocated by Su and Judd (2012) and then imposed a monotonicity constraint on
3 The actual example in Fibich and Gavish (2011) where the authors noted this behavior is
F1pv1q  v1 and F2pv2q  v
2
2 for vn P r0, 1s. Notice that this example is equivalent to the coalition
situation that was first considered by the backwards-shooting method of Marshall et al. (1994).
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candidate solutions. Because projection methods do not need to solve the system
of differential equations iteratively, they tend to be faster and more efficient than
backwards-shooting algorithms. Furthermore, they avoid the inherent instability of
backwards-shooting algorithms. On the other hand, they provide the user with less
control over the solutions obtained, and as Hubbard et al. (2013) showed, applica-
tions of these methods may not necessarily be flexible enough to approximate some
of the more complex PSNE bidding functions—particularly those that may intersect
each other.4
Despite the large variety of numerical algorithms that have been proposed, as
Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) recently noted, they all have something in common:
One weakness of all research in this literature is that all evidence con-
cerning the performance of the proposed approach is purely numerical
and done via example: no one has considered analytically the efficiency
and convergence properties of the proposed solutions...a shortcoming of
this field is that no one has proved that an approach converges to the
truth.
Furthermore, observe that these methods also share something else in common: they
all consider the poorly behaved system of differential equations given in (2.4). Conse-
quently, the literature in numerical methods has largely paralleled the first approach
used to answer the theoretical questions of existence and uniqueness that we men-
tioned at the end of Section 2.2.
However, as we also pointed out at the end of Section 2.2, there has been another
successful approach to answering these theoretical questions—one that avoids hav-
ing to directly analyze the complicated differential system. Instead, this approach
attempts to find PSNE to games with successively finer action sets and appeals to
4 That is, PSNE functions that do not exhibit first-order stochastic dominance—a recent area of
research in the literature that we will discuss in a later section.
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limiting arguments to show that a sequence of these finite-action PSNE converges
to the continuum-action PSNE solution. More importantly, and as noted by Athey
(2001), this motivates a computational algorithm with a convergence result. Conse-
quently it is rather surprising that, to our knowledge, there is no numerical method
in the literature to date that is based on this approach.
2.4 Equilibrium Solution for Auctions with Finite Sets
The existence of an equilibrium solution to the general asymmetric auction problem
with N bidders was first established by Lebrun (1996), who proved this result by
approximating the original asymmetric auction game with a sequence of finite-action
games. Existence of at least one Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) in
each of these finite-action games is guaranteed by Nash’s Existence Theorem. Lebrun
then extended this existence result to the continuum-action situation by showing that
the limit of Nash equilibria for these approximating games is itself a Nash equilibrium
of the original asymmetric auction game.
Meanwhile, Maskin and Riley (2000) used a slightly different approach in estab-
lishing their own proof of existence of an equilibrium for asymmetric auction games.
Rather than a finite-action space, the authors instead approximated the original
game with a sequence of games having finite, discrete types and a continuum-action
space. Because Nash’s Existence Theorem no longer applies under this situation,
an equilibrium solution no longer necessarily exists in each of these games when the
standard tie-breaking rule of selecting a winner at random is enforced. However,
Maskin and Riley were able to prove the existence of a monotonic equilibria when a
second-round Vickrey auction is instead used as the tie-breaking rule. Afterwards,
they extended their existence result under this modified tie-breaking rule to the case
of a continuous type space by considering the limit of this sequence of games. Fi-
nally, they established the existence of a continuous equilibrium under the standard
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auction rules and assumptions by arguing that ties will never occur in the continuous
case anyway. As a result, the bidding strategies that are obtained in the limit re-
main best response strategies even when the second-round Vickrey tie-breaking rule
is changed. A similar argument is also adopted several years later by Jackson and
Swinkels (2005), who proved existence of equilibria for a wide class of private value
auctions under even more general tie-breaking rules—such as allowing the auctioneer
to break ties by using information that he would not normally have (e.g., the true
values of the bidders).
The final paper adopting the auction with finite sets approach that we consider
in this chapter is Athey (2001). As this is also the paper that our proposed algorithm
will most closely follow, we devote the following subsection to its discussion.
2.4.1 Athey (2001)
Unlike the papers that we have discussed so far, Athey (2001) allowed the utility
functions and the supports Tn for the type distributions Fn to be different across
bidders. As we shall later see, this allows us to generalize our proposed algorithm to
cases that other numerical methods are unable to handle or have not yet considered.
Furthermore, rather than directly address the question of the existence of a PSNE,
Athey instead considered the simpler question of whether the single crossing condi-
tion (SCC) holds. The SCC was first introduced by Karlin (1968), and later had its
definition generalized by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) as follows:
Definition 1 (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). The function h : R2 Ñ R satisfies the
single crossing condition in px, θq if for all x1 ¡ x and θ1 ¡ θ:
hpx1, θq ¡ hpx, θq ñ hpx1, θ1q ¡ hpx, θ1q
and
hpx1, θq ¥ hpx, θq ñ hpx1, θq ¥ hpx, θ1q.
19
For our purposes, however, it is enough to describe the underlying intuition be-
hind the SCC as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy
(i.e., higher types choose nonstrictly higher actions), a player’s best response is to
also use a nondecreasing strategy. From our discussion in Section 2.2, it is clear that
the auction problem that we are considering satisfies the SCC.
Athey then noted that any nondecreasing strategy is a step function whenever
the set of available actions is finite. Therefore, any nondecreasing strategy for bidder
n can be described by simply enumerating the types at which he “jumps” from one
action to the next higher action.
More specifically, consider the following representation. Let BM   b0, b1, ..., bM(
denote the set of actions (bids) in ascending order that are available to all of the
bidders, where M   1 is the number of possible actions. Notice that here we have
assumed a common action set for all bidders.5 Furthermore, because participation
in a finite-action auction is assumed to be voluntary, the action b0 denotes the choice
to not participate in the auction—a decision which always provides a fixed, certain
utility of zero.
Next Athey defined
ΣMn 
 
vn P T M 2n |v0n  vn ¤ v1n ¤ ... ¤ vMn ¤ vM 1n  v¯n
(
, (2.5)
and she let ΣM  ΣM1  ... ΣMN . The relationship between a vector vn P ΣMn and
any nondecreasing strategy for bidder n, αMn : Tn Ñ BM , can then be described as
follows:
5 Athey (2001) also initially made this assumption for notational simplicity. Eventually this
condition is relaxed and she proves existence for the more general case of bidder’s with different
action sets.
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Definition 2 (Athey (2001)). A nondecreasing strategy for bidder n, αMn : Tn Ñ BM
is represented by a vector vn P ΣMn if:
1. vmn  inf
 
vn|αMn pvnq ¥ bm
(
whenever there is some k ¥ m such that αMn pvnq 
bk on an open interval of Tn, and vmn  v¯n otherwise; and
2. αMn pvnq  bmaxtm|vmn  vnu for all vn P T Mn z tvnu.
Therefore, each component of the vector vn P ΣMn can be regarded as a “jump
point” of the step function described by a bidding strategy αMn for bidder n. This can
be visualized in Fig. 2.1. Notice, however, that vn can be consistent with more than
one nondecreasing strategy because it does not specify the exact behavior for types
vn P tvnu. Because the type distributions are assumed to be atomless, however, we
can ignore this technicality as these points have measure zero and do not affect the
bidding behavior of the other players.
b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
v vn
1 vn
2 vn
3
=vn
4 v
Value
B
id αn
M
Figure 2.1: A stylistic example of a nondecreasing finite-action step function strat-
egy αMn that specifies when bidder n “jumps” to a higher action. Notice that Def-
inition 2 allows for some jump points to be equal. So, for this example v3n  v4n
implies that the probability of action b3 being used is 0. When we propose our own
algorithm in Section 2.6, however, we impose an additional constraint that prevents
this from happening.
Under the standard auction assumptions, Athey was able to show that if the SCC
holds in a game where the action space is finite for all bidders, then there exists a
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fixed point in ΣM . Consequently, this implies that the game has a PSNE where
each player’s equilibrium strategy is nondecreasing. We denote these PSNE bidding
functions as βMn for all n to distinguish them from any other nondecreasing strategy
αMn that may not necessarily be a PSNE bidding function.
Furthermore, by carefully accounting for discontinuities that arise in the limit as
the finite bidding units become increasingly small (i.e., as M Ñ 8), Athey was able
to establish the existence of a PSNE β to the continuum-action auction game as
the limit of a sequence of PSNE to finite-action games
 
βM
(
. More formally, she
accomplished this by first proving that
 
βM
(
converges uniformly to β except on
a set of arbitrarily small measure. This result, coupled with the fact that each βM
is a PSNE, allowed Athey to argue that no mass points arise in the limit. Hence β
is indeed a PSNE of the continuum auction game.
In addition, recall that Athey was able to establish her existence result without
requiring many of the assumptions commonly imposed by others. Consequently,
her results extend to more general asymmetric auction games that had largely been
ignored—such as situations where bidders have different supports for their type dis-
tributions or where bidders have heterogeneous utility functions.
More importantly, and as Athey went on to note, her convergence result was par-
ticularly significant because it motivated a computational algorithm: compute PSNE
to games with successively finer action sets. Notice that this approach differs greatly
from the strategies of the numerical methods discussed in Section 2.3 that consider
the poorly behaved system of differential equations given in (2.4). Furthermore, this
algorithm would also obtain the convergence property that has been so elusive in the
literature.
Of course, creating the algorithm that is suggested by Athey’s results is easier said
than done. Recall that the PSNE for any finite-action auction game is a fixed point
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solution to a nonlinear system of equations. As pointed out by Athey, however, find-
ing this fixed point is rather difficult since there is no global “contraction mapping”
theorem. Therefore, the simplest fixed point iteration methods are not guaranteed
to converge (and in practice they tend to perform rather poorly). Consequently,
another approach is needed.
In the next section we introduce some of the intuition behind our own algorithm
that is motivated in part by the results derived in Athey (2001). We do this by
showing the connection between Athey’s jump points and the bidders being exactly
indifferent between two different actions.
2.5 Points of Indifference
Recall that Athey (2001) showed that every finite-action auction has a PSNE in
nondecreasing strategies where, in order to describe a nondecreasing strategy, we
need only specify a step function whose jump points correspond to the types at
which a player switches from one action to the next higher action. In this section,
we investigate this behavior from the actual decision process that a bidder faces.
In particular, we consider points where a bidder is exactly indifferent between two
actions. This perspective helps to motivate the algorithm that we propose in the
next section.
We begin by considering the following scenario. Suppose that bidder n is trying
to decide which of two bids he would prefer: bm1 or bm, where bm1   bm. No matter
what his actual type vn is, as a rational agent he will make his decision by evaluating
the expected utility that each bid provides. In particular, the relationship between
the preferences of a bidder with type vn and his expected utilities will behave as
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follows:
bm1 ¡ bm ðñ  vn  bm1  Prpbm1 winsq ¡ pvn  bmq  Prpbm winsq,
bm1   bm ðñ  vn  bm1  Prpbm1 winsq   pvn  bmq  Prpbm winsq,
bm1  bm ðñ  vn  bm1  Prpbm1 winsq  pvn  bmq  Prpbm winsq.
(2.6)
Next, let us suppose that there exists a type vmn P Tn where bidder n is exactly
indifferent between actions bm1 and bm. Therefore, using (2.6) we know that the
following equality holds at this point:
 
vmn  bm1
  Prpbm1 winsq  pvmn  bmq  Prpbm winsq. (2.7)
But notice that (2.7) can only hold if Prpbm1 winsq   Prpbm winsq is true. There-
fore, for all  ¡ 0, the following inequality must also be true:
  Prpbm1 winsq     Prpbm winsq. (2.8)
Adding (2.7) to (2.8) gives:
 
vmn    bm1
  Prpbm1 winsq   pvmn    bmq  Prpbm winsq, (2.9)
which implies that all of bidder n’s types vn ¡ vmn strictly prefer bidding bm to bm1.
Similarly, it is easy to show that for all  ¡ 0:
 
vmn   bm1
  Prpbm1 winsq ¡ pvmn   bmq  Prpbm winsq. (2.10)
So, all of bidder n’s types vn   vmn strictly prefer bidding bm1 to bm.
Therefore, in addition to being a point of indifference, vmn is also the exact point
where bidder n jumps from action bm1 to bm. Furthermore, vmn is the only point for
bidder n where this behavior can occur.
And although the fact that bidder n is indifferent between bm1 and bm at vmn
implies that we may not necessarily be able specify his optimal action at this point,
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we do not need to. Like the jump points in Athey (2001), his behavior at this point of
indifference has measure zero and will not affect the best responses of other bidders.
In the next section, we introduce our algorithm that is largely motivated by this
idea. Specifically, it attempts to construct a finite-action PSNE by iteratively solving
a nonlinear system of equations to find these points of indifference.
2.6 Proposed Algorithm: The Backwards Indifference Derivation (BID)
Algorithm
In this section, we propose the Backwards Indifference Derivation (BID) algorithm,
which is a backwards-shooting algorithm that is motivated in part by the results
of Athey (2001) and the intuition described in Section 2.5. Specifically, the goal of
the BID algorithm is to construct a finite-action PSNE by finding where bidders are
indifferent between two different actions.
Similar to Athey, given the type distributions F and the reserve price r, the finite-
action PSNE that is constructed by the BID algorithm is one that is characterized
by:
• A finite set of potential actions that are commonly available to all bidders:
BM   b0, b1, ..., bM( , (2.11)
where the actions are indexed in ascending order.
• A vector vn P ΣˆMn for each bidder n specifying the types at which he jumps
from one action to the next higher action, where
Σˆ
M
n 
 
vn P T M 2n |v0n  vn   v1n   ...   vMn   vM 1n  v¯n
(
. (2.12)
• A bidding function βMn for each bidder n that corresponds to his vector of jump
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points vn as follows:
βMn pvnq  b01rv0n,v1nspvnq  
M 1¸
m2
bm11pvm1n ,vmn spvnq, (2.13)
where vn P Tn, and 1Apvnq is the indicator function that is equal to 1 if vn P A
and equal to 0 otherwise.
Notice that, unlike Athey, we are requiring the vector of jump points to contain
distinct components—which is why we have defined the new set of vectors in Σˆ
M
n
using strict inequalities. Therefore, in the finite-action PSNE constructed by the
BID algorithm, each action in BM will be used be at least some types vn for all n.6
Our algorithm attempts to numerically approximate nontrivial continuous PSNE
bidding functions where the codomain rb, b¯s is the same for all bidders who actually
choose to participate in the auction.7 This includes the standard model that we
described in Section 2.2 where the support for the type distributions is identical, but
also encompasses some situations that are less well understood and have largely been
ignored in the literature. In particular, like Athey, we are allowing the support Tn
for the type distributions Fn to be different across the bidders.
8
Consequently, it is necessary to impose boundary constraints on the PSNE so-
lutions that are more general than the ones we considered in Section 2.2. Like the
standard model, we assume that the lower bound b is always a priori known, but that
the upper bound b¯ may be potentially unknown. We also assume that v¯n ¡ b for all
n, as bidders who never participate in the auction can be excluded from the analysis.
6 This is a consequence of how the BID algorithm constructs the PSNE Note that Definition 2,
which is based on Athey (2001), allows for there to be actions which are entirely ignored by a bidder
and never used.
7 An example of a bidder who would always choose not to participate in the auction would be
someone who’s maximal type is less than the reserve price (i.e., v¯n   r).
8 This situation leads to a slightly different system of differential equations then the one described
in (2.4), which may explain why other numerical methods ignore this situation. However, Athey
(2001) and Lebrun (2006) show that a PSNE still exists in these cases.
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Meanwhile, the boundary conditions imposed on the PSNE functions are as follows.
The right-boundary condition is βnpv¯nq  b¯ for all n. The left-boundary condition
for bidders with vn   b is βnpbq  b, while bidders with vn ¥ b have βnpvnq  b
as their relevant boundary condition. Like always, all types vn   b choose not to
participate in the auction. Notice that these constraints reduce to those described
in Section 2.2 when the standard model with identical supports is being assumed.
We also need some method of accounting for ties. The BID algorithm considers
a modified auction rule where all of the highest bidder(s), and only the highest
bidder(s), receive the object (or some other substitute offering the same exact payoff).
This modified rule still preserves the SCC. Therefore, by our earlier discussion of
Athey (2001), we know that a PSNE still exists for any finite-action auction operating
under this modified auction rule, and we eventually prove that our algorithm does
in fact construct a finite-action PSNE under these assumptions.
Admittedly, the tie breaking rule that we are considering is quite nonstandard
in the literature. One can perhaps argue that, when we pass to the limit to the
continuous case, the probability of a tie occurring has measure zero—which would
imply that the tie-breaking rule was irrelevant to begin with. Indeed, as we have
already mentioned in Section 2.4, this approach has previously been used by others
in this space to establish properties of asymmetric auctions as the limit of finite-set
auctions being conducted under other highly unusual tie-breaking rules (Maskin and
Riley, 2000; Jackson and Swinkels, 2005). We do not, however, actively nor rigorously
try and argue this point here. Instead, like all prior research in this area, we offer
what we believe to be compelling numerical evidence regarding the effectiveness of
the BID algorithm. This evidence includes passing a recently proposed necessary
visual “test” that other methods have failed, and arriving at results that agree with
known closed-form solutions to auction asymmetries that other methods have been
unable to consider.
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It is helpful to think about the BID algorithm in two parts: a core inner part
whose purpose is to construct the finite-action PSNE and an outer shell part that
improves the accuracy of the algorithm by adjusting the guess for the true maximal
bid b¯. Consequently, we introduce the BID algorithm by first discussing the details
of the core algorithm in the next subsection. Afterwards, we describe how the outer
algorithm can be used to search for the unknown high bid. Finally, we prove that
the results of the BID algorithm do indeed characterize a finite-action PSNE under
the auction rules that we are considering.
2.6.1 Core Algorithm: Constructing Finite-Action PSNE
Recall that we are trying to find the solution to the asymmetric auction problem
where the codomain rb, b¯s for the PSNE bidding functions βn is the same for all n
and where, in practice, the true maximal bid b¯ is a priori unknown. Fortunately,
this problem has been extensively discussed in the backwards-shooting literature—a
class that the BID algorithm falls into. Therefore, for the purposes of discussing the
BID algorithm we first treat b¯ as being known in the core algorithm. Later we show
how the outer algorithm can, in theory, be used to improve the accuracy of our guess
for b¯ to within some accuracy γ ¡ 0 of the truth.
The core algorithm begins by first designating one of the bidders as the “reference
bidder” in the sense that it uses a partitioned set of “seed points” along the support
of his type distribution to help guide the process along. Although the actual finite-
action PSNE that is constructed by the BID algorithm will vary somewhat depending
on which bidder is used as the reference, the process of the core algorithm and the
fact that it produces a finite-action PSNE will remain unchanged. For these reasons,
along with the fact that we are more interested in the limiting behavior of these
finite-action PSNE, we proceed by using bidder 1 as the reference bidder.
Similarly, in general the seed points used to partition the reference bidder’s sup-
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port do not necessarily have to be equally spaced. For the purposes of discussing the
core algorithm, however, it is convenient to treat them as being equally spaced with
a step size of h:
tv1, v1   h, v1   2h, ..., v¯1  h, v¯1u . (2.14)
After the reference bidder and his seed points have been set, the core algorithm
proceeds by setting bM  b¯ and vM 1n  v¯n for all n. This step simply initializes the
strategies to ensure that all bidders will satisfy the desired upper boundary condition:
βMn pv¯nq  b¯ for all n.
Next assume that, for some integer index m, we know the values bm and vm 1n
for all n. At this point the goal of the algorithm is to try to find a new, smaller
action bm1 and a new, smaller set of jump points vm1 , v
m
2 , ..., v
m
N that maintains and
extends the PSNE structure that has already been constructed up to this point.
This can only be accomplished if, for all n, these new set of points vmn truly are
points where the bidders will switch from bidding this new action bm1 to the higher
action bm that we are assuming as known. By our discussion in Section 2.5, we treat
this process as trying to find the types vmn where each bidder is exactly indifferent
between bidding bm1 and bm. This can be mathematically expressed by setting the
expected utilities that the bidders receive from these actions equal to each other:
$'''&
'''%
pvm1  bm1q  Prp1 wins with bm1q  pvm1  bmq  Prp1 wins with bmq
pvm2  bm1q  Prp2 wins with bm1q  pvm2  bmq  Prp2 wins with bmq
...
pvmN  bm1q  PrpN wins with bm1q  pvmN  bmq  PrpN wins with bmq,
(2.15)
where we are assuming that bm and vm 1n are known for all n. This implies that we
can find the exact probability of each bidder n winning the auction with a bid of bm.
To see why, recall that we are attempting to construct a finite-action PSNE such
that vm 1n is the point where all bidders n switch from bidding b
m to bm 1. But
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since strategies must be nondecreasing, this then implies that all types vn   vm 1n
for all bidders n must bid bm or lower. Hence, Fnpvm 1n q gives the probability of any
particular bidder n placing a bid of bm or lower. So, under the auction rules that we
laid out earlier, bidder 1 wins the auction with a bid of bm if everyone else bids bm
or lower. Therefore, Prp1 wins with bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q.9 Similar arguments can be
used to find the probability of any of the other bidders winning with a bid of bm.
Next observe that, because we want the values vmn to be the points where bidders
jump from bm1 to bm, we can also apply this same reasoning to infer what the
probability of any bidder n winning with bm1 will be. For example, the relevant
probability for bidder 1 would be Prp1 wins with bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q.
Substituting all of these probabilities into (2.15) gives the following nonlinear
system of expected utility equations:
$''''''''''''&
''''''''''''%
pvm1  bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
 pvm1  bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
pvm2  bm1q 
¹
n2
Fnpvmn q
ff
 pvm2  bmq 
¹
n2
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
...
pvmN  bm1q 
¹
nN
Fnpvmn q
ff
 pvmN  bmq 
¹
nN
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
,
(2.16)
where we are treating the action bm and the N points vmn as the unknowns to be
solved for. Therefore, we have N equations and N   1 unknowns.
Before solving the system in (2.16), however, we have to impose the following
constraints in order to ensure that the solution we arrive at exhibits the behavior
9 Note that this is not quite the exact argument when m  M , as the points vM 1n  v¯n simply
denote the upper bound on the support for their type distributions and no longer represent a point
where the bidders jump to a higher action. In this case the expression still holds, however, because
under the auction rules we are considering, bidder 1 can guarantee that he wins the auction by
bidding bM  b¯. This agrees with the probability of winning the auction with a bid of bM  b¯ given
in the expression: Prp1 wins with b¯q 
¹
n1
Fnpv
M 1
n q 
¹
n1
Fnpv¯nq  1.
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that is required of a PSNE:
bm1   bm,
vn   vmn   vm 1n for all n,
bm ¤ vmn for all n.
(2.17)
The first constraint, bm1   bm, simply highlights the fact that we are only interested
in solutions that yield a smaller action. Similarly, vn   vmn   vm 1n for all n, is
imposed to make sure that the new jump point that we find for each bidder n is
smaller than the last jump point vm 1n that was found for him, while still lying in
the support for his type distribution.10 The third set of constraints, bm ¤ vmn for all
n, ensures that vmn is only considered a valid jump point solution from action b
m1
to bm if the bidders receive a nonnegative payoff (because otherwise they would be
better off not participating in the auction).
Finally, we impose an additional “pseudo constraint” on bidder 1 (the reference
bidder) to help guide the algorithm. Let i be a positive indexing integer where we
first let i  1. Then before solving the nonlinear system in (2.16), the core algorithm
provisionally sets vm1  vm 11  i  h. Intuitively, we can think of this as follows.
Suppose that, for reasons other than expected utility, all bidders highly value the
added flexibility of having two equivalent actions to choose from if they are able to
do so. In particular, bidder 1 enjoys this freedom along his set of seed points given in
(2.14). Therefore, knowing that vm 11 was the last jump point for bidder 1 that was
found, the BID algorithm looks to accommodate his request by using another one of
his seed points (i.e., vm1  vm 11  i h, for some i) to solve the nonlinear system given
in (2.16). Here standard numerical routines (e.g., Newton-Raphson, secant method,
etc.) can be used to try to find numerical solutions to this system.
10 Notice that this condition also means that the interval pvmn , v
m 1
n q will be nonempty for each
bidder, guaranteeing that there exist at least some types for each bidder whose best response is to
actually bid bm.
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If we can facilitate his request by finding a solution to (2.16), then we have
determined a new action bm and a new set of types vmn for all n such that everyone
is simultaneously indifferent between choosing bm1 and bm. In this case, we have
successfully found what we have been looking for. Therefore, we keep these values
and move on to the next iteration of the algorithm, where we search for additional
indifference points using the next largest seed point that bidder 1 has available (i.e.,
by setting i  1).
Of course there may be times when we cannot satisfy his wishes for this temporar-
ily fixed seed point vm1 , which is a situation that occurs when a numerical solution
to (2.16) cannot be found. In this case, the algorithm attempts to do the next best
thing: no new values are kept, the index i is incremented up by one, and we try to
fulfill bidder 1’s request by temporarily fixing vm1  vm 11  i  h at the next largest
seed point that he has available.
This iterative process of trying to find the points of indifference continues as long
as vm 11  i  h ¡ v1. This stopping point for the core algorithm can be attributed
to the fact that, by Athey (2001), we know that for all n and all δ ¡ 0 there exists
a finite-action PSNE where each bidder type on vn P rvn, vn   δs is required to use
action b0 and opt not participate in the auction.
When the core algorithm concludes, we are left with a finite increasing set of ac-
tions
 
b1, b2, ..., bM  b¯( and an increasing set of jump points  v2n, v3n, ..., vM 1n  v¯n(
for all n that solve a sequence of the nonlinear systems given in (2.16). Notice that,
although we have briefly mentioned it in the previous paragraph, the choice b0 to
not participate in the auction has not yet been formally included in the action set.
Furthermore, the set of values v0n and v
1
n for each bidder have also not been added to
the set of jump points. These values are accounted for in the outer algorithm that
we will be discussing in the next subsection.
Finally, observe that the cardinality of the set of seed points is always at least
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as large as the resulting set of jump points that the core algorithm has constructed
for each bidder n. This is a consequence of what occurs when the core algorithm
fails to keep any new values when it cannot find a solution to the nonlinear system
given in (2.16). Therefore, the actual value of M is unknown until the algorithm is
finished running. This same reasoning also applies to the index m, whose actual value
is unknown during each iteration. These reasons may partially excuse the slightly
clumsy use of our notation for these indices.
In summary, the core part of the BID algorithm proceeds as follows
Core Algorithm
1. Initialize bM  b¯ and vM 1n  v¯n for all n.
2. Initialize the indexing integer i  1.
WHILE vm 11  i  h ¡ v1, where m always indexes the most recently kept
value for bm:
(a) Provisionally set vm1  vm 11  i  h.
(b) Attempt to solve the nonlinear system of equations given in (2.16)
subject to the constraints given in (2.17).
(c) IF a numerical solution is found:
Set i  1.
Keep the solved values for bm1 and vmn for all n.
ELSE:
Set i  i  1.
In the next subsection we describe the outer part of the BID algorithm that allows
us to approximate the true unknown maximal bid b¯.
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2.6.2 Outer Algorithm: Estimating b¯
Recall that the core algorithm assumed that the maximal bid b¯ for the right bound-
ary condition was known. In reality, however, this assumption will rarely hold—
particularly in the case of asymmetric auctions—and typically one must guess the
true value of b¯ before implementing a numerical algorithm. Fortunately, much re-
search has been devoted to improving the accuracy of this guess. This section de-
scribes the one that is implemented in the BID algorithm, allowing it to find an
interval of length γ containing the true highest bid b¯.
Recall that a backwards-shooting algorithm attempts to solve a two-point bound-
ary value problem by approaching it as an initial value problem. In the case of
the asymmetric auction problem, for all n the a priori unknown upper boundary
βnpv¯nq  b¯ is treated as the initial condition while the a priori known lower bound-
ary condition βnpvnq  b is treated as the target condition. By fixing b¯ at some
initial guess, solving the system backwards, and then checking whether the target
condition is satisfied, a backwards-shooting algorithm makes adjustments so that
subsequent guesses for b¯ are closer to the truth—provided that there is some way of
knowing what adjustments actually need to be made when the target condition is
not satisfied. Luckily, recent developments in the area of asymmetric auctions that
characterize the behavior of a solution when it has an incorrectly initialized b¯ allow
us to systematically make these adjustments.
Observe that any guess for the true b¯ can be off in exactly one of two ways: it
can either be too high or too low. When the guess is too high, Hubbard and Paarsch
(2014) noted that solutions to the system of differential equations (2.4) never reach
the known target condition βnpvnq  b. Instead, the system approaches the 45
line and the bidders’ optimal bids start to approach their valuations: βnpvnq Ñ vn.
If we look at this behavior from the perspective of the inverse bidding functions,
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φnpbnq Ñ bn, we can see why the solution never reaches the target condition: some
of the denominators in (2.4) vanish and the system approaches a singularity.
Consider what happens in the core part of the BID algorithm when the guess
for b¯ is too high. If bids begin to approach their valuations, then for some iteration
of step 2 we will eventually be attempting to solve (2.16) by treating bm  vm 1n
as the known values for the bidders. In particular, our reference bidder 1 will have
bm  vm 11 . The core algorithm will then be attempting to find solutions to (2.16)
while temporarily fixing vm1  vm 11  i  h   bm for i  1. Recall, however, that
one of the constraints placed on the system is bm ¤ vm1 , which ensures nonnegative
utilities. Hence not only will no solution to the system be found for this attempt, but
subsequent attempts are also guaranteed to fail because the algorithm will always
be temporarily fixing a seed point vm1   bm. Consequently, at the end of the core
algorithm we are left with the smallest action that we have constructed being larger
than the known left boundary condition b. Therefore, if b1 ¡ b, then we know that
we have guessed b¯ to be too high.
However, if our guess for b¯ is too low, then Fibich and Gavish (2011) showed that
the solution to (2.4) diverges in the sense that βnpvnq Ñ 8 for all n. In this situa-
tion, the core part of the BID algorithm will conclude with the smallest constructed
action being smaller than the known left boundary condition.11 Therefore, if b1   b,
then we know that we have guessed b¯ to be too low.
The following simple example illustrates how this behavior is expressed in our
core algorithm.
Example 1 (Continued)
We return to the symmetric two bidder example with F pvq  v, where v P r0, 1s.
Earlier we saw that the PSNE solution had a closed-form that was given by βpvq  v
2
.
11 This is the reason why we did not include the additional constraint that bm ¡ b to (2.17).
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Therefore, the true maximal bid is known to be b¯  1
2
. Meanwhile, the minimal bid
(i.e., the known target condition) is b  0.
Fig. 2.2 demonstrates the behavior of the core algorithm when it was initialized
at different guesses for the maximal bid, and when a step size of h  104 was used.
When the algorithm was initialized at the true value of b¯, it produced a result that
agrees with the known PSNE solution. When the guess for the maximal bid was too
high, as was the case with b¯H , the result approached the 45
 line and the algorithm
never reached the known target condition b  0. When the guess for the maximal
bid was too low, which occurred with b¯L, then βpvq Ñ 8. This behavior agrees
with the theoretical results and allows us improve our guess of b¯ after each run of
the core algorithm.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Value
B
id bHb 
bL
Figure 2.2: The behavior of the core part of the BID algorithm when it was
initialized at different guesses for the maximal bid. Earlier we showed that PSNE
solution is given by βpvq  v
2
and that the true maximal bid is known to be b¯ 
1
2
. Initializing the algorithm at this true value produced results that agree with
the known PSNE solution. When initialized too high at b¯H , however, the results
approached the 45 line. When initialized too low at b¯L, results diverged to 8.
In particular, as Li and Riley (2007) and Bajari (2001) showed, for a given accu-
racy of γ ¡ 0 it is possible to use this behavior to create a binary search method to
determine an interval rb¯L, b¯U s of length less than γ that will (at least theoretically)
contain the true maximal bid b¯. Specifically, first let b¯L  b and b¯U  max
n
tv¯nu be
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the initial lower and upper bounds on our guess for the true b¯, respectively.12 The
complete BID algorithm then proceeds as follows:
BID Algorithm
1. WHILE b¯U  b¯L ¡ γ OR b1   b
(a) Set b¯  b¯L b¯U
2
.
(b) Run the Core Algorithm, which gives
 
b1, b2, ..., bM
(
.
(c) IF b1 ¡ b:
Set b¯U  b¯.
ELSE:
Set b¯L  b¯.
2. Set v0n  vn and v1n  b1 for all n.
3. Add the choice b0 to the set of available actions.
At the end of the BID algorithm, we have constructed a finite set of actions BM ,
a vector of jump points vn P ΣˆMn for each bidder n, and a bidding function βMn for
each bidder n that corresponds to his vector of jump points vn as defined in (2.13).
Here there are several things worth mentioning. First, computational time for
each full run of the core algorithm increases as the step size decreases. Consequently,
the computational time can be improved if these earlier iterations of the core algo-
rithm are run with larger step sizes to give a general sense of where the true b¯ is.
However, the reader should be aware that the interval rb¯L, b¯U s only provides us with
a theoretical error bound of γ. As noted by Li and Riley (2007), there are other
12 Observe that the true b¯ must lie in this interval due to the boundary constraints being imposed
on the PSNE solution.
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sources of error that can increase γ—such as computational inaccuracies that arise
when evaluating functions (e.g., the type distribution) or solving the nonlinear system
in (2.16). Therefore, the interval constructed for one step size may not necessarily
overlap with the interval constructed for another step size. Consequently, caution
should be used if the reader decides to gradually decrease the step size for subsequent
runs of the core algorithm.
Next, observe that in step 1 of the BID algorithm we have included b1   b as
one of the conditions for the WHILE loop. This simply ensures that we have b1 ¡ b
when the entire BID algorithm finishes running (otherwise the PSNE solution would
not make sense).
Finally, recall that the choice b0 to not participate in the auction and the jump
points v0n and v
1
n for all n were conspicuously absent at the conclusion of the core
algorithm. Steps 2 and 3 of the complete algorithm rectify this problem. Further-
more, notice that the jump point v1n  b1 is indeed a point where all bidders are
indifferent between actions b0 and b1 as both actions provide these types with an
expected utility of 0.
In the next subsection we prove that the BID algorithm constructs a finite-action
PSNE under the auction rules that we discussed previously in Section 2.6.
2.6.3 Proof that the BID Algorithm Constructs a Finite-Action PSNE
Given the type distributions F and the reserve price r, the BID algorithm produces
a finite-action set BM , a vector of jump points vn P ΣˆMn for each bidder n, and a
bidding function βMn for each bidder n that corresponds to his vector of jump points
vn as first defined in (2.13). In this section we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given the type distributions F and the auction rules laid out in
Section 2.6, the finite-action set BM and the bidding functions βM constructed by
the BID algorithm characterize a finite-action PSNE.
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Proof. To prove this proposition we have to show that any bidder n’s best response
is to use the strategy βMn , given that:
• Everyone else’s type distributions are Fn.
• The set of available actions is BM .
• Everyone else is following the strategies prescribed by βMn.
For expository clarity, we only prove this result for bidder 1 as the proof for any
other bidder is symmetric.
We would like to show that bidder 1’s best response is given by the following
strategy:
βM1 pv1q  b01rv01 ,v11spv1q  
M 1¸
m2
bm11pvm11 ,vm1 spv1q,
where v1 P T1.
First, we show that bidder 1 will bid bm1 if v1 P pvm11 , vm1 q for all integers
1 ¤ m ¤ M   1. Recall that, by the BID algorithm’s construction, for integers
2 ¤ m ¤ M the set of jump points vm1 P tv1u give the exact points where bidder
1 is indifferent between bidding bm1 and bm. In particular, these points satisfy the
following equation:
pvm1  bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
 pvm1  bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
. (2.18)
Next, observe that for all  ¡ 0:
 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
   
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
. (2.19)
By adding (2.18) to (2.19), we see that:
pvm1    bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
  pvm1    bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
, (2.20)
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which implies that all types v1 ¡ vm1 strictly prefer bidding bm to bm1
Similarly, it is easy to show that for all  ¡ 0:
pvm1   bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
¡ pvm1   bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
, (2.21)
which implies that all types v1   vm1 strictly prefer bidding bm1 to bm.
Therefore, for all integers 2 ¤ m ¤M , we can represent the relationship between
bidder 1’s types and his preferences as follows:
v1 ¡ vm1 ñ bm1   bm,
v1   vm1 ñ bm1 ¡ bm,
v1  vm1 ñ bm1  bm.
(2.22)
So for all integers 2 ¤ m ¤M , the set of jump points divide bidder 1’s support into
regions that allow us to infer his preferences.
Next consider m  1 and suppose that v1   v11. But recall that the BID algorithm
sets v11  b1. Therefore, the best response for types v1   v11 is to select action b0
and not participate in the auction as any other choice provides a negative expected
utility. Similar reasoning shows that types v1 ¡ v11 will strictly prefer b1 to b0 because
b1 provides a positive expected utility while b0 gives a utility of 0. Finally, the type
v1  v11 is exactly indifferent between bidding b0 and b1 as he receives an expected
utility of 0 from both. Therefore, the relationship in (2.22) also holds for m  1.
Since (2.22) holds for all integers 1 ¤ m ¤ M , we can now use the transitive
property to determine his optimal bid for any v1 P T1z tvnu. Specifically, suppose
that v1 P pvm11 , vm1 q for some integer 1 ¤ m ¤ M   1. Then the following must be
true:
v1 ¡ vm11 ¡ vm21 ¡ ... ¡ v01 ñ bm1 ¡ bm2 ¡ ... ¡ b0,
v1   vm1   vm 11   ...   vM1 ñ bm1 ¡ bm ¡ ... ¡ bM ,
(2.23)
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and his best response is to choose action bm1. Therefore, for all integers 1 ¤ m ¤
M   1, we have shown that bidder 1 will bid bm1 if v1 P pvm11 , vm1 q.
Next we have to prove that βM1 gives the best response for bidder 1’s types
v1 P tv1u. First consider m  0. Then v1  v1 and he will choose action b0 as any
other action gives him a negative expected utility. Meanwhile, if m  M   1, then
v1  v¯ ¡ vM1 and once again using (2.23) we see that his optimal action is to bid bM .
Finally in the case of integers 1 ¤ m ¤ M , we can once again use the relationships
given in (2.22) and the transitive property to show that:
v1 ¡ vm11 ¡ vm21 ¡ ... ¡ v01 ñ bm1 ¡ bm2 ¡ ... ¡ b0,
v1   vm 11   vm 21   ...   vM1 ñ bm ¡ bm 1 ¡ ... ¡ bM ,
v1  vm1 ñ bm1  bm,
(2.24)
and that in these situations he is indifferent between bidding bm1 and bm. Conse-
quently, for his types v1 P tv1u, bidder 1 has no incentive to deviate from the strategy
prescribed by βM1 .
Therefore, we have shown that βM1 is indeed the best response strategy for bidder
1 and that the BID algorithm constructs a finite-action PSNE.
Although this proof is not formally a convergence result for the BID algorithm,
it does show that the algorithm produces a finite-action PSNE when given a set
of candidate jump points along one of the bidder’s type space (i.e., the reference
bidder’s seed points). Consequently, as this result closely resembles the convergent
numerical method suggested by Athey (2001), the next aspect to consider is the
algorithm’s performance as the step size hÑ 0 (i.e., when given more and more seed
points along the reference bidder’s type space). This is investigated further in the
next example.
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Example 2
Consider the following example from Fibich and Gavious (2003). Suppose that we
have two bidders who draw their types from the following distributions:
F1pv1q  v1   .4v21p1 v21q, v1 P r0, 1s,
F2pv2q  v2  .4v22p1 v22q, v2 P r0, 1s.
Fig. 2.3 depicts these distributions. Notice that they do not cross in the interior as
F2 stochastically dominates F1.
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Figure 2.3: Type distributions for Example 2. These distributions do not cross in
the interior as F2 stochastically dominates F1.
Although this problem was first introduced by Fibich and Gavious, Kirkegaard
(2009) noted that they “do not plot bidding strategies or comment on whether they
intersect.” Kirkegaard also did not attempt to plot the strategies, but he did go on
to show that the equilibrium functions must intersect at least once in the interior—
despite the fact that the type distributions exhibit first order stochastic dominance.
In fact, Kirkegaard proved that first order stochastic dominance is a necessary, but
not sufficient condition for the PSNE solutions not to cross. We applied the BID
algorithm to this example with varying step sizes h. Results appear in Fig. 2.4.
So we see that the solutions appear to converge to a continuous solution as the
step size h decreases. Furthermore, the algorithm finds that the PSNE solutions
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Figure 2.4: Finite-action PSNE constructed by the BID algorithm for Example
2 using various step sizes h to investigate its convergence properties. Notice that,
despite the fact that the type distributions did not cross, the PSNE bidding functions
appear to converge to continuous functions that cross once in the interior—a result
which is consistent with Kirkegaard (2009). An accuracy of γ  108 was used in all
three cases. Left: h  .1. Center: h  .01. Right: h  .001.
cross once in the interior—a result that is consistent with Kirkegaard’s findings.
Of course, without a known closed-form solution to Example 2, it is difficult to
be completely sure that this is in fact the continuous PSNE solution. Unfortunately,
as there is still no convergent algorithm, this also happens to be the main weakness
of all numerical methods to date. There have been recent developments, however,
which allow us to test whether an algorithm’s solutions are consistent with economic
theory. We discuss this test and the theory behind it in the next section.
2.7 Using Economic Theory to Evaluate Numerical Solutions
Because no existing numerical method has yet been able to prove convergence, it
has been extremely difficult to evaluate any algorithm’s performance—particularly
in situations where there is no closed-form solution. Recent theoretical developments
derived in Kirkegaard (2009), however, provide a way forward that sidesteps the need
to examine the PSNE bidding functions directly. Hubbard et al. (2013) then showed
how these results can be used to evaluate the performance of any numerical method
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through a necessary visual “test” that must be passed.
Kirkegaard (2009) noted that, prior to his work, “all existing classes of numeri-
cal examples of asymmetry in first price auctions share a common feature...bidding
strategies will be found to cross at most once,” despite the fact that it was “straight-
forward to construct examples in which bidding strategies cross several times.” Con-
sequently, under the standard model assumptions discussed in Section 2.2, he pro-
ceeded to characterize the general behavior of these PSNE solutions that may cross.13
Specifically, he derived theoretical results that allow us to make qualitative pre-
dictions about how the PSNE bidding functions should behave by considering two
ratios: the ratio of the type distributions and the ratio of PSNE expected utilities.
For any two bidders i and j in the N bidder case, these ratios are defined as follows:
Fi,jpvq  Fjpvq
Fipvq , (2.25)
Ri,jpvq  EUipv, βipvqq
EUjpv, βjpvqq , (2.26)
where v P pv, v¯s. Notice that the first ratio is exogenously given (i.e., it is a priori
known since it is determined by the given type distributions) while the second ratio
is endogenously given (i.e., it is a priori unknown since it depends on the unknown
PSNE bidding functions βi and βj).
Kirkegaard showed that these two ratios must exhibit the following qualitative
behavior when the bidders are following their PSNE bidding functions:
Ri,jpvq ¡
 
Fi,jpvq ðñ βipvq ¡
 
βjpvq (2.27)
Ri,jpvq ¡
 
Fi,jpvq ðñ R1i,jpvq ¡
 
0. (2.28)
Here equation (2.27) determines which bidder is more aggressive in certain regions.14
13 Observe that we are once again assuming a common support Tn  rv, v¯s for the type distributions
Fn. An earlier version of Kirkegaard (2009) also has results that extend to the different support
case when there are exactly two bidders.
14 Given the same type, the more aggressive bidder is the one who chooses to place the higher bid.
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Notice that (2.27) also implies that, whenever the PSNE bidding functions cross at
some type v P pv, v¯s, the two ratios must cross at that same type as well. Meanwhile,
equation (2.28) limits the behavior of the paths that Ri,j can take: Ri,j is increasing
whenever it is above Fi,j, Ri,j is decreasing whenever it is below Fi,j, and Ri,j is
stationary whenever it crosses Fi,j. Some “possible” paths that would be consistent
with this (2.27) and (2.28) appear in Fig. 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Stylistic depiction of two “possible” paths that Ri,j could take that
would still be consistent with economic theory (figure reproduced from Kirkegaard
(2009)). Although qualitatively there are many such possible paths, quantitatively
only one will satisfy the conditions of the PSNE solution since it is unique.
Kirkegaard also derived results that show how Fi,j can be used to determine an
upper bound for the number of times that the PSNE bidding functions can cross
in v P pv, v¯q. Let vˆ1   vˆ2   ...   vˆK be the interior types where Fi,j is locally
maximized or minimized (i.e., “peaks”) and let vˆ0  v and vˆK 1  v¯. Kirkegaard
then showed that Ri,j and Fi,j can cross at most once in any of the intervals in
tpvˆk, vˆk 1s : k  0, ..., K  1u, and that cannot not cross in the interval pvˆK , vˆK 1s.
Therefore, the number of times the PSNE bidding functions can cross is bounded
above by the number of interior peaks K that Fi,j has.
45
Furthermore, Kirkegaard proved that there are certain situations where the num-
ber of times the PSNE functions cross must be equal to the number of interior peaks
K of Fi,j. These situations occur when Fi,j exhibits the “diminishing wave” prop-
erty. Intuitively, Fi,j exhibits the diminishing wave property when the following three
conditions are satisfied:
1. The interior peaks of Fi,j alternate between being above and below 1;
2. As v increases:
(a) The interior peaks of Fi,j that are above 1 get closer to 1;
(b) The interior peaks of Fi,j that are below 1 get closer to 1;
3. Fi,j is maximized or minimized as v Ñ v.
Fig. 2.6 depicts several examples of Fi,j that exhibit the diminishing wave property.
For the formal definition of the diminishing wave property, see Kirkegaard (2009).
Figure 2.6: Three examples of Fi,j which exhibit the diminishing wave property
(figure reproduced from Kirkegaard (2009)). Left: A stylistic example. Center:
Fipviq 
 
vi
5
2
, vi P r0, 5s and Fjpvjq a normal distribution truncated on r0, 5s with
mean µ  3 and standard deviation σ  1. Right: Fipviq  pvi{10q2, vi P r0, 10s while
Fjpvjq  13pG1pvjq G2pvjq G3pvjqq where Gi is a normal distribution truncated on
r0, 10s with mean µk  3k and standard deviation σ1  σ2  1 and σ3  0.25.
46
Kirkegaard proved that if Fi,j satisfies the diminishing wave property, then Ri,j
and Fi,j must cross exactly once in all of the intervals in tpvˆk, vˆk 1s : k  0, ..., K1u,
and they must not cross in the interval pvˆK , vˆK 1s. Therefore, by (2.27), in this
situation the number of times the PSNE bidding functions cross must be equal to
the number of interior peaks K that Fi,j has.
Consequently, even though the ratio of expected utility payoffs is endogenous,
Hubbard et al. (2013) noted that Kirkegaard’s results are suggestive of a neces-
sary visual “test” that can be used to help evaluate whether a numerical method’s
proposed solution is consistent with economic theory. Specifically, they proposed
estimating the true unknown ratio Ri,jpvq with Rˆi,jpvq, which is the ratio obtained
by using a numerical method’s approximated PSNE bidding functions. Plotting Fi,j
and Rˆi,j then gives a visual test for the numerical method’s proposed solutions. In
particular, according to Hubbard et al., one should pay specific attention to:
1. Slope: Whenever Fi,j and Rˆi,j cross (i.e., whenever the proposed PSNE bidding
functions cross), Rˆi,j should be flat. Meanwhile, whenever Rˆi,j is above Fi,j,
Rˆi,j should be increasing; whenever Rˆi,j is below Fi,j, Rˆi,j should be decreasing.
2. Location: Fi,j and Rˆi,j should cross at most once in any interval in tpvˆk, vˆk 1s :
k  0, ..., K  1u (and exactly once when the diminishing wave property is
exhibited), and never in the interval pvˆK , vˆK 1s.
Regardless of the actual method used by a numerical algorithm, this test can be
used to evaluate the validity of any solution that it produces. Therefore, any proposed
algorithm should yield solutions that, at the very minimum, pass this necessary test.
With this test in mind, we evaluated the performance of the BID algorithm using
various numerical examples. In all of the examples, a step size of h  104 and an
accuracy of γ  108 were used.
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Example 2 (Continued)
We applied the visual test to the PSNE solution that was obtained in Example 2.
Fig. 2.7 presents a summary of our results, where the right panel shows that the BID
algorithm’s solution passes the visual test.
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Figure 2.7: The BID algorithm applied to Example 2, where the type distributions
exhibited first order stochastic dominance. Kirkegaard (2009) showed that this is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the PSNE solutions not to cross. Left:
The type distributions that do not cross. Center: The finite-action PSNE solution
constructed by the BID algorithm that cross once (crossing indicated by the vertical
dotted line). Right: The BID algorithm passed the necessary visual test proposed
by Hubbard et al. (2013) (the vertical dotted line that appears here is the same as
the one in the center panel).
Furthermore, observe that this example highlights the fact that the number of
times the type distributions cross is not necessarily indicative of the number of times
the PSNE bidding functions will cross—a result that was proved by Kirkegaard
(2009). The next example, however, investigates a situation where we can determine
the exact number of crossings ahead of time.
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Example 3
Consider the following unsolved example that was first introduced by Kirkegaard
(2009), which we have normalized to the unit interval:
F1pv1q  v21, v1 P r0, 1s,
F2pv2q  1
3
pG1pv2q  G2pv2q  G3pv2qq , v2 P r0, 1s,
where Gipvnq is the cdf of a normal distribution truncated on r0, 1s with mean µi  3i10
and standard deviation σ1  σ2  110 and σ3  140 . Fig. 2.8 summarizes our results.
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Figure 2.8: The BID algorithm applied to Example 3, where F1,2 exhibits the
diminishing wave property. Left: The type distributions. Center: The finite-action
PSNE solution constructed by the BID algorithm (crossings indicated by the vertical
dotted line). Right: The BID algorithm passed the necessary visual test proposed
by Hubbard et al. (2013) (the vertical dotted lines that appears here are the same
as the ones in the center panel).
The first thing to notice from the right panel in Fig. 2.8 is that F1,2 exhibits the
diminishing wave property with four peaks. Therefore, from Kirkegaard (2009), the
PSNE bidding functions must cross exactly four times. The BID algorithm not only
produced PSNE solutions that were consistent with this result (center panel), the
solutions also passed the necessary visual test (right panel).
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Example 4
The final example we consider in this section is a three bidder situation that was
first introduced by Fibich and Gavish (2011). The type distributions are given by:
F1pv1q  v1, v1 P r0, 1s,
F2pv2q  v2   2v22p1 v22qp0.25 v22qp0.75 v22q, v2 P r0, 1s,
F3pv3q  v3  3v23p1 v23qp0.25 v23qp0.75 v23q, v3 P r0, 1s.
Fig. 2.9 portrays these distributions as well as the PSNE functions obtained from
the BID algorithm.
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Figure 2.9: The BID algorithm applied to a three bidder situation. Left: The
type distributions which cross twice in the interior (at vn 
?
0.25 and vn 
?
0.75).
Right: The finite-action PSNE solution constructed by the BID algorithm.
Fibich and Gavish investigated this example with their boundary-value method,
which we previously discussed in Section 2.3. In their analysis, they concluded that
because the three type distributions cross each other exactly twice in the interior (at
vn 
?
0.25 and vn 
?
0.75), by Kirkegaard (2009), the PSNE bidding functions
must also cross exactly twice in the interior. However, several flaws exist in their
application of Kirkegaard’s results.
First, as we have already discussed and as Kirkegaard first proved, the number
of times the type distributions cross is not indicative of the number of crossings for
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the PSNE bidding functions. Indeed, Example 2 can be used as a counter-example
to their argument.
Second, the result from Kirkegaard (2009) that Fibich and Gavish (2011) cited
does not actually base the number of crossings on the type distributions themselves
to begin with. Instead, as we discussed in Section 2.7, the number of crossings
for the PSNE functions is based on the number of interior peaks that the ratio of
type distributions has. Furthermore, Kirkegaard’s results are meant to be applied to
pairwise comparisons of the bidders—not all three bidders simultaneously as Fibich
and Gavish have done.
Finally, the exact number of crossings is known only when the diminishing wave
property is satisfied. From the bottom panels of Fig. 2.10, however, we see that none
of the ratios exhibits this property since lim
vÑ0
Fi,jpvq  1 for every pair of bidders,
which violates the diminishing wave property’s third condition that Fi,j is either
maximized or minimized as v Ñ 0. Therefore, we only have an upper bound on the
number of crossings—which, in this case, happens to be three for each pair of PSNE
bidding functions (since each pairwise ratio Fi,j has three interior peaks).
Incidentally, from Fig. 2.10 we see the finite-action PSNE functions produced by
the BID algorithm for each pair of bidders do end up crossing exactly three times—a
result that disagrees with Fibich and Gavish (2011). More importantly, every pair
of the BID algorithm’s PSNE functions passed the visual test. This suggests that
our results are consistent with economic theory.
In this section, we have presented several numerical examples suggesting that
the BID algorithm produces finite-action PSNE that converge to the continuum-
action PSNE solution. In the next section we briefly discuss other types auction
asymmetries that have typically been ignored in the literature. We also offer some
additional numerical evidence regarding the convergence of the BID algorithm to the
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Figure 2.10: The BID algorithm applied to a three bidder situation. Top Row: The
finite-action PSNE constructed by the algorithm for each pair of bidders (crossings
indicated by the vertical dotted lines). Bottom Row: The BID algorithm passed
the necessary test proposed by Hubbard et al. (2013) for each pair of bidders (the
vertical dotted lines that appears in each panel are the same as the ones in the panel
directly above it).
continuous PSNE solution.
2.8 Extensions of the Standard Model
In this section, we discuss some extensions of the standard auction model that was
introduced in Section 2.2. Deriving the PSNE bidding functions for these extensions
requires solving a system of differential equations that may present an entirely new
set of challenges. Given the difficulty that numerical methods have already had in
analyzing the standard model’s poorly behaved differential system that was given in
(2.4), it is perhaps not too surprising to learn that the numerical auction literature
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has been slow to consider these extensions.
Recall, however, that Athey (2001) was able to establish more general PSNE ex-
istence results using her finite-action PSNE approach that completely circumvented
the need to consider a system of differential equations. In particular, these existence
results extended to situations where bidders have different supports for their type
distributions or different utility functions. Because the BID algorithm is motivated
in part by Athey’s results, we evaluated its performance in these two situations by
using numerical examples with known closed-form solutions.
2.8.1 Different Supports for the Type Distributions
Vickrey (1961) was the first to analyze auctions as noncooperative games with incom-
plete information. He considered the case of two bidders whose types are uniformly
distributed on rv1, v¯1s and rv2, v¯2s where, without loss of generality, he assumed that
v1 ¤ v2. In his paper, Vickrey also presented the first PSNE solution by solving for
the symmetric case. However, he was unable to solve for the more general asymmet-
ric situation where the supports of the type distributions differed. A couple of years
later, Griesmer et al. (1967) managed to find the PSNE solution for when the lower
end point of the two supports was the same: v1  v2.
It was not until Kaplan and Zamir (2012), however, that Vickrey’s problem was
solved. In fact, by showing how to reduce the differential system into a single dif-
ferential equation, Kaplan and Zamir were able to provide an even more general
solution that also accounts for the presence of a reserve price r. Disregarding the
trivial situation where the reserve price is greater than the supports for the type
distributions (r ¡ v¯2 ¥ v¯1q, there are four possibilities to consider for the reserve
price:
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1. r ¤ v1 v2
2
,
2. r ¡ v1 v2
2
and r  v2,
3. r ¡ v1 v2
2
and r  v2,
4. v¯i ¤ r ¤ v¯j.
The first case, r ¤ v1 v2
2
, includes the no reserve price (i.e., r  0) problem
that Vickrey (1961) initially considered. Kaplan and Zamir (2012) showed that the
inverse PSNE bidding function for bidder 1 in this situation is given by:
φ1pb1q  v1  
pv2  v1q2
pv2   v1  2b1qc1e
v2v1
v2 v12b1   4pv2  b1q
, (2.29)
where
c1 
pv2v1q
2
v¯1v1
  4pb¯ v2q
2pb¯ bq e
v2v1
2pb¯bq , (2.30)
and
b  v1   v2
2
,
b¯  v¯1v¯2 
 v1 v2
2
2
pv¯1  v1q   pv¯2  v2q
.
(2.31)
Meanwhile, bidder 2’s inverse PSNE function φ2pb2q can be obtained from φ1pb1q by
simply interchanging the roles of v1, v¯1 and v2, v¯2 in equations (2.29) and (2.30).
Furthermore, notice that the minimum bid in this situation is given by b  v1 v2
2
.
Therefore, if v1   v2, then b ¡ v1 ¡ r and there will be some types of bidder 1
who will choose not to participate in the auction even if there is no reserve price—
something that did not occur in the standard model.
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Next, Kaplan and Zamir showed that the solution to the second case, r ¡ v1 v2
2
and r  v2, for bidder 1 in terms of his inverse PSNE function is given by:
φ1pb1q  v1  
pr  v1qpr  v2q
r  v2  c3pb1  rqθpb1   r  v1  v2qp1θq
, (2.32)
where
c3  pv¯2  v2qpv¯1  v1q

v¯1r
rv1 v¯2v2
	1θ

v¯2r
rv2 v¯1v1
	θ ,
θ  r  v1pr  v1q   pr  v2q
,
(2.33)
and
b  r,
b¯  v¯1v¯2  pv1   v2qr   r
2
pv¯1  v1q   pv¯2  v2q
.
(2.34)
Like before, bidder 2’s inverse PSNE function φ2pb2q can be obtained from φ1pb1q by
swapping the roles of v1, v¯1 and v2, v¯2 in (2.32) and (2.33).
Kaplan and Zamir then proved that the PSNE solution for the third situation,
r ¡ v1 v2
2
and r  v2 ¡ v1, for bidder 1 in terms of his inverse PSNE function is
given by:
φ1pb1q  v1  
v2  v1
1

rv2
v2v1
	 
c5   log

rv1
rv2
	 , (2.35)
where
c5  pv¯1  v2qpv2  v1qpv¯1  v1qpb¯ v2q
 log

v¯  v1
b¯ v2


, (2.36)
and
b  r,
b¯  v¯1v¯2  v1v2pv¯1  v1q   pv¯2  v2q
.
(2.37)
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Once again, bidder 2’s inverse PSNE function φ2pb2q is obtained from φ1pb1q by
switching the roles of v1, v¯1 and v2, v¯2 in (2.35) and (2.36).
Finally, in the PSNE for the fourth case, v¯i ¤ r ¤ v¯j, only types vj ¡ r participate
in the auction by bidding r.
We evaluated the performance of the BID algorithm by investigating whether its
solutions agreed with the known closed-form solutions of Kaplan and Zamir (2012).
Note that the results of Section 2.7 do not apply here since we are no longer assuming
a common support for the type distributions.15
Example 5
Consider the following example that was first presented by Kaplan and Zamir (2012):
V1  Uniformp0, 3q,
V2  Uniformp3, 6q,
r  2.
The inverse PSNE bidding functions can be obtained from (2.32), (2.33), and (2.34),
which gives:
φ1pb1q  8pb1  1q
8  b1pb1  4q ,
φ2pb2q  3  10pb2  2q
4  2b2  b22
.
Inverting these functions gives us the following PSNE solution:
β1pv1q 
2

2  v1 
a
4  2v1  v21
	
v1
, v1 P r2, 3s,
β2pv2q  v2  8 
?
5
a
8 4v2   v22
v2  3 , v2 P r3, 6s.
15 Although an earlier version of Kirkegaard (2009) does contain some relevant results, we do not
discuss them in this chapter.
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Fig. 2.11 shows the finite-action PSNE produced by the BID algorithm. Notice
that they coincide with the known closed-form analytic solutions.
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2 3 4 5 6
Value
B
id β1M
β2M
Figure 2.11: The BID algorithm applied to Example 5, where the type distributions
have different supports. These results agree with the known closed-form analytic
solution derived in Kaplan and Zamir (2012).
Closed-form solutions have also been derived for other asymmetric support sit-
uations. For example, Plum (1992) characterized the PSNE solution when types
are drawn from the power distributions F1pv1q  vx1 and F2pv2q 

v2
y
	x
when they
have the same lower bound on the support. Meanwhile Cheng (2006) derived the
analytic solution for F1pv1q  vx1 and F2pv2q 

v2
y
	z
and where the distributions
have the same lower bound and the upper bound is given by y  zpx 1q
xpz 1q
. Although
not depicted here, the BID algorithm also produced results that agreed with these
known closed-form solutions.
2.8.2 Different Utility Functions
Another assumption imposed in the standard model is that all bidders are risk neu-
tral. In reality, however, people will have different degrees of risk aversion. This
introduces a new type of asymmetry to the standard auction game.
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Let Unpvn, bq denote bidder n’s utility function where:
Upvn, bq 
"
gnpvn, bnq if bn ¡ bm for all n  m
0 otherwise.
Here gnpvn, bnq is a utility function that is specific to bidder n, giving the payoff that
he receives from winning the auction with a bid of bn. Meanwhile, we still assume
that he receives a utility of 0 if he loses the auction. Finally, we assume that the
utility function of each bidder is common knowledge.
Each bidder is then looking to submit the bid that maximizes his expected utility,
which is now given by:
max
bn
EUnpvn, bnq  max
bn
#
gpvn, bnq
¹
mn
Fmpφmpbnqq
+
. (2.38)
Like the standard model, this leads to system of poorly behaved differential equations
that generally do not have a closed-form solution. See Hubbard and Paarsch (2014)
for a more rigorous treatment of this problem.
Under these new assumptions on the utility functions, however, the results derived
in Athey (2001) still apply. Therefore, a PSNE exists in every finite-action game, and
there exists a sequence of finite-action PSNE that converges to the continuum-action
PSNE solution. Consequently, the analysis of a difficult differential system can be
avoided by finding jump points instead.
Before the BID algorithm can be applied to this situation, however, step 2 of its
core part requires some slight modifications. In particular, rather than (2.16), we
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will now be trying to solve the following nonlinear system:
$''''''''''''&
''''''''''''%
g1pvm1 , bm1q 
¹
n1
Fnpvmn q
ff
 g1pvm1 , bmq 
¹
n1
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
g2pvm2 , bm1q 
¹
n2
Fnpvmn q
ff
 g2pvm2 , bmq 
¹
n2
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
...
gNpvmN , bm1q 
¹
nN
Fnpvmn q
ff
 gNpvmN , bmq 
¹
nN
Fnpvm 1n q
ff
,
(2.39)
Meanwhile, the rest of the BID algorithm proceeds as normal.
Unfortunately, it is now arguably even more difficult to evaluate the performance
of the BID algorithm under this circumstance: not only is there still no general
closed-form solution, the results of Kirkegaard (2009) now no longer apply. In fact,
to our knowledge, the only known closed form solution to this situation is the case
of symmetric risk-averse bidders that was provided by Krishna (2002).
Specifically, Krishna assumed two symmetric bidders with the same type dis-
tribution F pvq. In addition, these bidders also shared the same constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility of the form gnpvn, bnq  gpvn, bnq  pvn  bnqα, where
α P p0, 1q indexes the degree of risk aversion: as α Ñ 0, the bidder becomes more
averse. Krishna then showed that the PSNE solution for this situation coincides with
the PSNE solution for two symmetric risk-neutral bidders drawing their types from
rF pvqs 1α , where the relevant closed-form PSNE solution was given in (2.3).
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Example 6
Suppose that we have two symmetric bidders who share the following type distribu-
tion and utility function:
F pvq  ?v,
gpv, bq  pv  bq 12 ,
where v P r0, 1s. Observe that α  1
2
in this example.
By the results derived in Krishna (2002), we know that the PSNE should coin-
cide with the PSNE for two symmetric risk-neutral bidders drawing their types from
rF pvqs 1α  r?vs 11{2  v, where v P r0, 1s. But we have already found the correspond-
ing PSNE in Example 1. Therefore, the PSNE solution for this situation is given by
βpvq  v
2
.
Fig. 2.12 shows the results of the BID algorithm, which produced results that
agreed with this closed-form solution.
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Figure 2.12: The BID algorithm applied to a symmetric risk-averse bidders situa-
tion. Results agreed with the known closed-form analytic solution derived in Krishna
(2002).
Although there is no known general closed-form solution to the risk-averse bidders
model that we are considering in this section, Maskin and Riley (1984) derived some
theoretical results that allow us to make some predictions about the behavior of
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the bidders. In particular, they showed that higher levels of risk aversion leads to
more aggressive bidding behavior. The next example investigated whether the BID
algorithm produced solutions that were consistent with this result.
Example 7
Suppose that we have two bidders who both draw their types from the Uniformp0, 1q
distribution, but have different degrees of risk aversion:
gpv1, bq  pv1  bq
3
4 ,
gpv2, bq  pv2  bq
1
2 .
Notice that bidder 2 is more risk averse than bidder 1. Therefore, by Maskin and
Riley (1984), we know that bidder 2 will be more aggressive in his bids (i.e., given
the same valuation, bidder 2 will choose to place a higher bid).
Fig. 2.13 shows the results of the BID algorithm, which agree with Maskin and
Riley’s result.
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Figure 2.13: The BID algorithm applied to a situation where bidders are symmetric
in their type distributions, but asymmetric in their degrees of risk aversion. Results,
which show the more risk averse bidder (bidder 2) bidding more aggressively, are
consistent with Maskin and Riley (1984).
Finally, we note that because this subsection describes a nonstandard assumption
in the literature, there is still no general consensus on how to model this problem.
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Our approach mirrors that of Hubbard and Paarsch (2014). Cox et al. (1982), on the
other hand, considered a different situation where each bidder knows his own utility
function but treats the utility function of others as random variables. Meanwhile,
others that have also investigated bidders with different degrees of risk-aversion un-
der different model assumptions include Maskin and Riley (1984) and Guerre et al.
(2009).
2.9 Applications
The rapid growth of Internet advertising has led to the creation of a unique ad
exchange auction environment that must reconcile the interests of the many different
stakeholders in the industry. This has led to the introduction of new concepts to the
auction literature, such as the generalized second price auction that is employed by
search engines to sell sponsored “pay-per-click” advertisements that appear alongside
the organic results (Edelman et al., 2007).16
In this section, however, we focus on the real-time bidding (RTB) auctions
that have recently emerged from the incredible increase in the amount of “pay-
per-impression” ad opportunities being offered.17 Specifically, every time a user
accesses a website with an eligible pay-per-impression ad slot, a request is sent to
an ad exchange that then holds an RTB auction that transpires over milliseconds.
This auction begins with the ad exchange sending advertisers data associated with
the user (e.g., his demographic information, his location, the webpage being loaded,
etc.), which advertisers then use to decide how much to bid on the ad slot. The
highest bidding advertiser then wins the right to display their ad, which is loaded
onto the webpage before being displayed to the user.
16 Organic search results are the results that naturally appear because of their relevance to the
keywords being searched.
17 In a pay-per-impression scheme, the advertiser pays for each showing (i.e., impression) of the
advertisement, regardless of whether or not it elicited a response (e.g., a click or a purchase).
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Despite the impressive technology behind RTB auctions, however, they still oper-
ate via the familiar second-price sealed-bid auction format where the highest bidder
still wins, but only pays the amount that the second highest bidder bid. Auction the-
ory provides several justifications for this format choice. Indeed, the most well-known
property of the second-price sealed-bid auction is that it induces truthful bidding
among the participants (i.e., the PSNE for all bidders is to bid their type: βnpvnq  vn
for all n). Consequently, this auction format also results in efficient allocations of the
good (i.e., the winner is the bidder with the highest valuation). Furthermore, under
some fairly general assumptions, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem—one of auction
theory’s most remarkable and important concepts—guarantees that the auctioneer’s
expected revenue under the second-price sealed-bid auction format will be the same
as it would be under many other auction formats.
Unfortunately, one of the assumptions of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is
that bidders are symmetric and risk neutral, which are tenuous assumptions at
best—particularly in the online advertising world given the number of advertisers
participating in the industry. Consequently, additional revenue can be potentially
generated in an RTB auction by modifying the format. As we have already seen,
however, auction theory is currently hard pressed to provide concrete answers as to
how this revenue can be optimized when asymmetries are present. Therefore, numer-
ical approximations are required (Marshall et al., 1994; Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Li
and Riley, 2007).
Motivated by this, we applied the BID algorithm in order to investigate how an
auctioneer’s expected revenue is affected by switching to a first-price auction or by
manipulating the reserve price r.18 In addition, we also considered how the variance
of the revenue is affected by these changes. This was accomplished via the following
18 We assume the following in the presence of a reserve price. In a first-price auction, the winning
bidder (if there is one) pays his bid. Meanwhile, in a second-auction, the winning bidder (if there
is one) pays the maximum of the the second highest bidder’s bid and the reserve price r.
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Monte Carlo simulation:
Monte Carlo Simulation to Approximate Expected Revenues
1. Given: the reserve price r and the type distributions F .
2. For t  1, ..., T :
(a) Draw a sample from each type distribution: v
ptq
n  Fn for all n.
(b) Simulate a first-price auction equilibrium:
(i) Use BID algorithm to obtain finite-action PSNE functions βM .
(ii) First-price PSNE bids are given by b
ptq
n  βMn pvptqn q for all n.
(iii) Determine the first-price revenue R
ptq
1 .
(c) Simulate a second-price auction equilibrium:
(i) Second-price PSNE bids are given by: b
ptq
n  vptqn for all n.
(ii) Determine the second-price revenue R
ptq
2 .
3. Calculate Monte Carlo approximations:
(a) Expected Revenues:
EpR1q  1
T
T¸
t1
R
ptq
1 ,
EpR2q  1
T
T¸
t1
R
ptq
2 .
(b) Variance of the Revenues:
V arpR1q  1
T  1
T¸
t1

R
ptq
1  EpR1q
	2
,
V arpR2q  1
T  1
T¸
t1

R
ptq
2  EpR2q
	2
.
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Example 8
Consider the following example introduced by Marshall et al. (1994), who also ex-
amined expected revenues:
F1pv1q  v1, v1 P r0, 1s,
F2pv2q  v24, v2 P r0, 1s.
In our Monte Carlo simulations, we used r  0, .01, .02, ..., .99 and T  1,000,000.
Results appear in Fig. 2.14.
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Figure 2.14: Monte Carlo simulations for Example 8. Left: When there is no
reserve price, the first-price auction generates more expected revenue than the second
price auction; under the optimal reserve price of r  .66, however, the second-price
auction actually generated more revenue. Right: The variances of the revenues. The
second-price auction always had a higher variance.
When there is no reserve price, the expected revenues were:
EpR1q  0.5050,
EpR2q  0.4664.
Therefore, the first-price auction generates more expected revenue than the second-
price auction in this situation—a result that is consistent with Marshall et al. (1994).
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Meanwhile, the optimal reserve price for both auction formats occurred when
r  .66, in which case the expected revenues were:
EpR1q  0.6087,
EpR2q  0.6132.
So in this situation, the second-price auction actually generates slightly more ex-
pected revenue than the first price auction—a result that agrees with Fibich and
Gavious (2003).
Furthermore, the right panel in Fig 2.14 shows that the second-price auction
always has a higher variance in the revenue generated than the first-price auction,
with this variance being substantially higher when no reserve price is imposed. And
although it was not investigated here, Monte Carlo simulations can also be used to
approximate other auction properties such as efficiency or bidder surplus.
Consequently, this example highlights the fact that auctioneers may stand to
benefit from modifying their current format. And although numerical methods like
the BID algorithm can help auctioneers to make this decision, they also arguably
serve an even greater purpose by filling in some of the gaps that currently exist in
auction theory.
2.10 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed the BID algorithm that numerically approximated the
continuous PSNE solution through a sequence of finite-action PSNE that were con-
structed by finding where bidders were indifferent between two different actions. We
then used numerical examples to evaluate the performance of the BID algorithm—
including examples that are not typically considered by other numerical methods—
and results showed that the BID algorithm produced solutions that were consistent
with economic theory. Afterwards, we applied the BID algorithm to show how auc-
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tions could be modified in order to generate more revenue for the auctioneer.
Consequently, although we have not formally established the convergence result
that has been so elusive in the numerical auction literature, we have presented a
compelling alternative to the prevailing approach in numerical methods.
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3Cross-Domain Recommender Systems
3.1 Introduction
Although the rapid growth of the Internet has made an enormous amount of infor-
mation and choices available to users, it has also frequently overwhelmed them and
caused them to make poor decisions (e.g., in buying or comparing products). At
the same time, this information overload has also made it difficult for advertisers to
reach users who are likely to interested in their products. In order to address these
challenges, recommender systems have been developed to help filter the information
and display only the content that a user is likely to enjoy.
Although recommender systems have been successfully implemented in many
different settings, research in this area has largely focused on models that make
recommendations within a single domain (e.g., movies in the case of Netflix or music
in the case of Pandora Radio). Oftentimes, however, companies such as Amazon.com
would like to make recommendations that span multiple domains. In these situations,
recommendations in one domain can potentially be improved by leveraging knowledge
from other domains—a concept which has motivated the recent development of cross-
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domain recommender systems.
In this chapter, we propose a cross-domain recommender system that is a multiple-
domain extension of the Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization model that was
first proposed by Salakhutdinov and Mnih (2008b). We begin by briefly reviewing
the literature on recommender systems in Section 3.2. This overview focuses primar-
ily on the models that are most closely related to the cross-domain model that we
propose in Section 3.3. Afterwards, in Section 3.4, we provide experimental results
showing that our proposed model outperforms other related models in two different
cross-domain recommendation situations. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Work
This section primarily focuses on the recommender systems that are most closely
related to the cross-domain model that we propose in the next section. For a more
comprehensive overview of the recommender system literature, see Ricci et al. (2011).
Suppose that we have N users and M items, where for the time being we treat
the items as belonging to a single domain. Furthermore, assume that the users rate
items on some fixed scale that depends on the constraints set by the recommender
system—such as integers between 1 and S, where S is frequently equal to 5, 10, or
100. The models we discuss, however, are sufficiently general enough to handle all
of the most popular ratings scales.
Let R P RNM denote the user-item rating matrix. Here entry Rij is the rating
that user i gave to item j, where this entry is blank if the actual rating is “unknown”
(i.e., if the user has not rated the item). The goal of the recommender system is
to predict these unknown ratings, and subsequently recommend the items that it
believes its users will rate highly.
However, in general R will be extremely sparse since users will typically have
rated only a very small fraction of the items that are being offered. For example,
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the training dataset in the popular Netflix Prize competition contained 100,480,507
observed ratings that 480,189 users gave to 17,770 movies. This results in a user-item
rating matrix that is over 98% empty.
Two main approaches have been used in designing recommender systems: content-
based filtering and collaborative filtering. In general, content-based filtering algo-
rithms rely on a description of each item and a profile for each user characterizing
his preferences. Specifically, these models attempt to create a content-based profile
for each user that is based on a weighted average of item features that the user has
previously liked, and subsequently recommends the items that best match the user’s
profile. Statistical techniques used in this approach have included neural networks
(Jennings and Higuchi, 1992), decision trees (Kim et al., 2001), and Bayesian classi-
fiers (Pazzani et al., 1996). Meanwhile, an example of a content-based filtering model
that has found success in recent years is the music recommender system of Pandora
Radio.1 In their “Music Genome Project,” each song in the system is analyzed using
up to 450 distinct musical characteristics (“genes”), and user profiles are created by
using feedback on songs previously heard.2
The collaborative filtering approach, on the other hand, attempts to design a
recommender system without having to rely on an actual explicit description of
the items. Although this approach may consider item-to-item similarity, it is also
motivated by the idea that users will enjoy the items that other like-minded users
have enjoyed. Consequently, more emphasis is placed on using the rating matrix to
identify these groups of users with similar preferences. Perhaps the most successful
implementation of a collaborative filtering approach is Amazon.com’s recommender
system (“Customers who bought this item also bought”). Meanwhile, tools that
have been used in this approach have included Bayesian networks (Breese et al.,
1 http://www.pandora.com/
2 http://www.pandora.com/about/mgp
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1998), clustering methods (Ungar and Foster, 1998), and matrix factorization meth-
ods (Salakhutdinov and Mnih, 2008a).
In particular, factor-based matrix factorization models have found much recent
success in the collaborative filtering literature. These models begin by positing that
user preferences are determined by a small number of unobserved factors, which are
modeled as vectors belonging to some low-dimensional latent space. Meanwhile, the
items in the system are also conceptualized as vectors in this low-dimensional space
based on how strongly they “match” these unobserved factors. A user’s rating of an
item is then modeled by combining his latent feature vector with the latent feature
vector of the item.
In a linear factor-based model, which is the primary focus for the remainder of
this chapter, this combination is chosen to be the inner product of the two latent
feature vectors. Specifically, the N M rating matrix R is modeled as the product
of a D  N user feature matrix U and a D M item feature matrix V , where D
corresponds to the dimensionality of the latent space that is fixed beforehand (Rennie
and Nati, 2005; Nati and Jaakkola, 2003). Training such a model then consists of
finding the best rank-D approximation to the observed NM rating matrixR under
some given loss function.
3.2.1 Probabilistic Matrix Factorization (PMF)
Perhaps the most popular and influential linear factor-based model is the Probabilis-
tic Matrix Factorization (PMF) model that was recently introduced by Salakhutdinov
and Mnih (2008a). Although other probabilistic factor-based models have been pro-
posed prior to PMF (Hofmann, 1999; Marlin, 2004; Marlin and Zemel, 2004), they all
suffered from either slow or inaccurate approximations to the posterior distribution
over their hidden factors.
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PMF begins by assuming the following likelihood over the observed ratings:
ppR|U ,V , αq 
N¹
i1
M¹
j1

NpRij|UTi V j, α1q
Iij
, (3.1)
where α is the precision parameter and Iij is the indicator variable that is equal to
1 if user i rated item j and equal to 0 otherwise.
Next, zero-mean spherical Gaussian prior distributions are placed over the user
feature matrix U and the item feature matrix V :
ppU |αUq 
N¹
i1
NpU i|0, α1U Iq,
ppV |αV q 
M¹
j1
NpV j|0, α1V Iq.
The model is then learned by maximizing the log-posterior over the user and item
features with fixed hyperparameters α, αU , and αV :
log ppU ,V |R, α, αU , αV q  log ppR|U ,V , αq   log ppU |αUq   log ppV |αV q   C,
where log denotes the natural log and C is some constant that does not depend
on the model parameters U and V . Maximizing this log-posterior is equivalent to
minimizing the sum of squared errors objective function with quadratic regularization
terms:
E  1
2
N¸
i1
M¸
j1
IijpRij UTi V jq2  
λU
2
N¸
i1
}U i}2F  
λV
2
M¸
j1
}V j}2F , (3.2)
where λU  αU{α, λV  αV {α, and }}2F denotes the squared Frobenius norm. A
local minimizer of equation (3.2) can then be found by performing gradient descent
in U and V .
Salakhutdinov and Mnih (2008a) also proposed several extensions to their stan-
dard PMF model. The first extension was to pass the inner product between user
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and item feature vectors through the logistic function gpxq  1{p1   exppxqq. In
this situation, the observed data likelihood becomes:
ppR|U ,V , αq 
N¹
i1
M¹
j1

N
 
Rij|g
 
UTi V j

, α1
Iij
.
In addition, the integer ratings 1, ..., S are mapped to the r0, 1s unit interval using
the function tpxq  px  1q{pS  1q. These slight modifications to the standard
PMF model help to improve performance by bounding the range of predictions and
ensuring that they match the range of valid rating values. Like before, this logistic
PMF model can be learned by performing gradient descent in U and V .
Salakhutdinov and Mnih also proposed the constrained PMF model, an extension
that attempts to improve the predictions for infrequent users (i.e., users who have
not rated many items). Specifically, let W P RDM be a latent similarity constraint
matrix whose entries measure the similarities between the items and the latent vari-
ables. In this constrained model, the latent feature vector for user i is instead defined
as:
U i  Y i  
M¸
k1
IikW k
M¸
k1
Iik
, (3.3)
where Iik is 1 if user i rated item k and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, the k
th column of
W can be interpreted as the effect of a user having rated item k has on the prior
mean of the user’s feature vector. Consequently, users that have rated similar items
will tend to have similar prior distributions for their feature vectors. Meanwhile, Y i
can be viewed as an offset that is added to the mean of the prior distribution to get
the feature vector U i for user i.
The conditional likelihood over the observed ratings for this constrained model
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is then:
ppR|Y ,W ,V , αq 
N¹
i1
M¹
j1

N
 
Rij|g
 
UTi V j

, α1
Iij
,
where U i is given by (3.3) and g is once again the logistic function. Meanwhile, the
latent similarity constraint matrix W is regularized by placing a zero-mean spherical
Gaussian prior on it:
ppW |αW q 
M¹
k1
NpW k|0, α1W Iq.
As with the other PMF models, this constrained model is trained by minimizing the
sum of squared errors objective function with quadratic regularization terms:
E  1
2
N¸
i1
M¸
j1
IijpRij  g
 
UTi V j
q2   λY
2
N¸
i1
}Y i}2F 
λV
2
M¸
j1
}V j}2F  
λw
2
M¸
k1
}W k}2F ,
where λY  αY {α, λV  αV {α, and λW  αW {α. Once again, a local minimizer of
this objective function can be found by performing gradient descent in Y , W , and
V .
Salakhutdinov and Mnih then showed that all of their PMF models perform
extremely well on the Netflix Prize competition dataset, handily outperforming Net-
flix’s own CineMatch recommender system at the time of the competition. Fur-
thermore, when the predictions of their PMF models were linearly combined, they
achieved an error rate (in terms of RMSE) that was nearly 7% better than Cine-
Match. To help put this achievement into perspective, recall that Netflix was offering
a 1 million US dollar prize to a team that was able to improve upon CineMatch’s
RMSE score by at least 10%, which was a feat that was only accomplished by com-
bining the results from over 100 different models (Koren, 2009).
However, Salakhutdinov and Mnih pointed out that a major disadvantage of
training their PMF models is the need for manual complexity control in order to make
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the models generalize well to sparse and imbalanced datasets. Consequently, the
process of finding appropriate and optimal values for the regularization parameters
(i.e., λU and λV ) is extremely computationally expensive, and typically involves
training a multitude of models before choosing the model that performs the best.
This eventually led the authors to propose a fully Bayesian treatment of their PMF
model, which we discuss in the next subsection.
3.2.2 Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization (BPMF)
A major drawback of the PMF models was having to find and specify appropriate
values for the regularization parameters. In order to address this issue, Salakhutdinov
and Mnih (2008b) proposed Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization (BPMF),
which is a fully Bayesian extension of their standard PMF model that provides
automatic complexity control by using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods
to integrate out model parameters and hyperparameters. Furthermore, BPMF uses
a predictive distribution for the ratings, which handles uncertainty more effectively
than the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the PMF models.
BPMF begins by assuming the same conditional likelihood of the observed ratings
as the standard PMF model that was given in (3.1):
ppR|U ,V , αq 
N¹
i1
M¹
j1

NpRij|UTi V j, α1q
Iij
.
Unlike the PMF models, however, BPMF places the following prior distributions
over the user and item latent feature vectors:
ppU |µU ,ΛUq 
N¹
i1
NpU i|µU ,Λ1U q,
ppV |mV ,ΩV q 
M¹
j1
NpV j|mV ,Ω1V q.
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Afterwards, BPMF assumes the following Gaussian-Wishart priors for the hyper-
parameters:
ppΘU |Θ0q  NpµU |µ0, pβ0ΛUq1qW pΛU |W 0, ν0q,
ppΦV |Φ0q  NpmV |m0, pb0ΩV q1qW pΩV |Ψ0, n0q,
where we have defined ΘU  tµU ,ΛUu, Θ0  tµ0, ν0,W 0u, ΦV  tmV ,ΩV u, and
Φ0  tm0, n0,Ψ0u for notational convenience. In addition, here W pW 0, ν0q denotes
the Wishart distribution parametrized with ν ¡ D  1 degrees of freedom and a
D D positive definite scale matrix W 0:
W pΛ|W 0, ν0q 9 |Λ|
ν0D1
2 exp

1
2
trpW10 Λq


.
The data generating process of BPMF can then be summarized as follows:
1. For each user i, draw a vector of latent features U i  NpU i|µU ,Λ1U q.
2. For each item j, draw a vector of latent features V j  NpV j|mV ,Ω1V q.
3. For each item j rated by user i, draw a rating Rij  NpRij|UTi V j, α1q.
The goal of BPMF is to invert this generative model and obtain the posterior
predictive distribution for the rating Rij that user i gives to item j. This distribution
is obtained by integrating over the model parameters and hyperparameters:
ppRij|R,Θ0,Φ0q 
» »
ppRij|U i,V jqppU ,V |R,ΘU ,ΦV q
ppΘU ,ΦV |Θ0,Φ0qd tU ,V u d tΘU ,ΦV u .
(3.4)
However, this expression is analytically intractable. Therefore, Salakhutdinov and
Mnih turned to MCMC-based methods in order to generate samples
!
U
ptq
i ,V
ptq
j
)
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that are used to approximate the predictive distribution in equation (3.4). This is
accomplished by using the following Monte Carlo approximation:
ppRij|R,Θ0,Φ0q 
1
T
T¸
t1
ppRij|U ptqi ,V ptqj q,
which asymptotically yields exact results. Because the full conditional distributions
for the BPMF model can be easily sampled from, Salakhutdinov and Mnih opted for
a Gibbs sampling algorithm in their paper.
Specifically, the full conditional distribution over the item feature vector V j is
given by:
ppV j|R,U ,ΦV , αq 9
N¹
i1

NpRij|UTi V j, α1q
Iij
NpV j|mV ,Ω1V q
9 N

V j|mj ,

Ωj
1	
, (3.5)
where
Ωj  ΩV   α
N¸
i1

U iU
T
i
Iij
,
mj 

Ωj
1 
α
N¸
i1
rU iRijsIij  ΩVmV

.
Furthermore, notice that the latent item feature matrix V factorizes into the product
of the full conditional distributions of all of the items in the system:
ppV |R,U ,ΦV q 
M¹
j1
ppV j|R,U ,ΦV , αq.
Consequently these distributions can be sampled in parallel, which greatly improves
the computational speed of the MCMC.
Next, the full conditional distribution over the item hyperparameters also has a
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closed form that is easy to sample:
ppΦV |V ,Φ0q 9 ppV |mV ,ΩV qppΦV |Φ0q
9 NpmV |m0 , pb0ΩV q1qW pΩV |Ψ0 , n0q, (3.6)
where
m0 
b0m0  M V¯
b0  M , b

0  b0  M, n0  n0  M,
rΨ0s1  Ψ10  M S¯  
b0M
b0  M pm0  V¯ qpm0  V¯ q
T ,
V¯  1
M
M¸
j1
V j, S¯  1
M
M¸
j1
pV j  V¯ qpV j  V¯ qT .
Meanwhile, using the symmetry of the BPMF model, the full conditional distri-
bution for the user feature vectors can also be easily sampled in parallel from the
following distributions:
ppU i|R,V ,ΘU , αq 9
M¹
j1

NpRij|UTi V j, α1q
Iij
NpU i|µU ,Λ1U q
9 NpU i|µi , rΛi s1q, (3.7)
where
Λi  ΛU   α
M¸
j1

V jV
T
j
Iij
,
µi  rΛi s1

α
M¸
j1
rV jRijsIij  ΛUµU

.
Finally, the posterior over the user hyperparameters is given by the Gaussian-
Wishart distribution:
ppΘU |U ,Θ0q 9 ppU |µU ,ΛUqppΘU |Θ0q
9 NpµU |µ0 , pβ0 ΛUq1qW pΛU |W 0 , ν0 q, (3.8)
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where
µ0 
β0µ0  NU¯
β0  N , β

0  β0  N, ν0  ν0  N,
rW 0s1 W10  N S¯  
β0N
β0  N pµ0  U¯qpµ0  U¯q
T ,
U¯  1
N
N¸
i1
U i, S¯  1
N
N¸
i1
pU i  U¯qpU i  U¯qT .
Therefore, the Gibbs sampling scheme for the BPMF model can be described as
follows:
Gibbs Sampling for Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization
1. Initialize the model parameters U 1 and V 1 at some values.
2. For iterations t  1, ..., T :
• Sample the hyperparameters from their full conditional distributions
given in equations (3.6) and (3.8):
ΦtV  ppΦV |V t,Φ0q,
ΘtU  ppΘU |U t,Θ0q.
• In parallel, sample the feature vector for item j  1, ...,M from its
full conditional distribution given in equation (3.5):
V t 1j  ppV j|R,U t,ΦV , αq.
• In parallel, sample the feature vector for user i  1, ..., N from his full
conditional distribution given in equation (3.7):
U t 1i  ppU i|R,V t 1,ΘU , αq.
Salakhutdinov and Mnih then compared the BPMF model against its PMF model
counterparts. Once again using the Netflix Prize dataset, they found that the BPMF
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model significantly outperformed the MAP-trained PMF models. Furthermore, they
observed that the MAP-trained models began to overfit as the latent feature dimen-
sionality D grew. Conversely, the performance of the BPMF model continued to
steadily improve as D increased.
3.2.3 Other Single-Domain PMF and BPMF Extensions
Given how well the PMF and BPMF models perform, it should come as no surprise
that several single-domain extensions of these models have been recently proposed.
In this subsection, we briefly discuss some of them.
Motivated by the belief that a user’s social connections will affect his judgment
and interest in items, Ma et al. (2008) proposed the Social Recommendation (SoRec)
algorithm in order to integrate user social network information into the PMF model.
Specifically, their algorithm hoped to learn a shared user latent feature space that
incorporates both the user social network structure and the user-item rating matrix.
This was accomplished by factoring the observed N N social network matrix into
a latent user feature matrix U and a latent social network feature matrix Z, where
this matrix U is the same as the one that is used in the factorization of the observed
user-item rating matrix R in PMF (hence the shared user latent feature space). A
zero-mean spherical Gaussian prior was then placed on this Z matrix and, like the
PMF models, MAP estimates were obtained by minimizing an objective function by
performing gradient descent.
Meanwhile, Shan and Banerjee (2010) proposed two generalizations of the PMF
and BPMF models. First, they investigated using a different prior distribution that
was more complex than the PMF model by relaxing the diagonal covariance assump-
tion (i.e., the independent latent features assumption), but simpler than the BPMF
model that maintains a distribution over all possible covariance matrices. In doing
so, they hoped to achieve a realistic model with a simpler learning process than a
80
fully Bayesian treatment. Afterwards, Shan and Banerjee tried to leverage side infor-
mation (e.g., movie cast, user gender, user marital status, etc.) in their predictions
by utilizing topic modeling algorithms such as correlated topic models and latent
Dirichlet allocation.
Similarly, Porteous et al. (2010) proposed their own extension of the BPMF
model that incorporates side information. Unlike Shan and Banerjee (2010), however,
they proposed regressing and linearly combining the side information with the final
prediction. In addition, the authors introduced a nonparametric Dirichlet process
mixture extension to BPMF in order to capture clusters of users or items that were
more similar to one another than to others in the population.
Finally, motivated by the idea that rating behavior may evolve over time, Xiong
et al. (2010) proposed Bayesian Probabilistic Tensor Factorization (BPTF) as a fully
Bayesian extension of BPMF that incorporates temporal relational factors such as
seasonality or trends. This was accomplished by indexing the time dimension. Along
with the user and item dimensions, this resulted in a three dimensional tensor. BPTF
then attempts to factor this tensor into three matrices: the user matrix U , the
item matrix V , and the time matrix T . As such, the probabilistic structure and
computational scheme of their proposed BPTF model is reminiscent of the standard
BPMF model.
3.2.4 Multi-Domain Collaborative Filtering
As we have seen, one of the biggest challenges in the area of recommender systems is
the fact that the user-rating matrix is extremely sparse because the number of items
being offered vastly outnumbers the number of items that a user has rated. Zhang
et al. (2010) attempted to address this issue with their Multi-Domain Collaborative
Filtering (MCF) model, which is a multiple-domain extension of the standard PMF
model. Specifically, by using PMF to model the ratings in each domain and then
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adaptively transferring knowledge across different domains through a learned domain
correlation structure, Zhang et al. hoped to alleviate the sparsity problem in any
single domain.
We begin by introducing some new notation in order to account for these addi-
tional domains. Suppose that we have N users and M total items, where the items
can be partitioned into k  1, ..., K different domains with Mk items belonging to
domain k. In this chapter we only consider the situation where items belong to ex-
actly one domain. Let Rk P RNMk denote the user-item rating matrix for domain
k where Rkij is the rating that user i gave to item j in domain k. As was the case
when we were considering single-domain recommender systems, the multiple-domain
models that we discuss are sufficiently general enough to handle the most popular
rating scales.
Similar to PMF, the goal of MCF is to factorize the user-item rating matrix for
each domain Rkij into a latent user feature matrix U
k P RDN and a latent item
feature matrix V k P RDMk . That is, column U ki represents user i’s latent feature
vector in domain k and column V kj represents item j’s latent feature vector in domain
k. Notice that for every domain k, the ith column vector U ki always corresponds to
the same user. On the other hand, since items belong to exactly one domain, the
jth column vector V kj corresponds to a different item in every domain k. Finally,
observe that the dimensionality D is assumed to be the same across all domains.
MCF begins by assuming the following likelihood over the observed ratings in the
kth domain:
ppRk|U k,V k, σ2kq 
N¹
i1
Mk¹
j1

N

Rkij|pU ki q
T
V kj , σ
2
k
	Ikij
, (3.9)
where Ikij is the indicator variable that is equal to 1 if user i rated item j in domain
k and equal to 0 otherwise. Observe that this likelihood is similar to the likelihood
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of the standard PMF model given in equation (3.1), with the main differences being
that MCF accounts for multiple domains and parametrizes the normal distribution
with a variance parameter instead of a precision parameter.
Like the standard PMF model, MCF proceeds by placing zero-mean spherical
Gaussian priors on the user and item features:
ppU k|λkq 
N¹
i1
NpUki |0D, λ2kIDq,
ppV k|ηkq 
Mk¹
j1
NpV kj |0D, η2kIDq.
Finally, in order to learn the correlation structure between the different domains,
MCF first defines the matrix U  rvecpU1q, ..., vecpUKqs P RNDK , where vecpq
denotes the vectorization operator that converts a matrix into a column vector by
stacking the columns of the matrix on top of one another, moving from left to right.
The following matrix-variate normal distribution is then placed on U :
ppU |Ωq MNND,KpU |0NDK , IND bΩq,
where MNa,bpM ,AbBq denotes the matrix-variate normal with mean M P Rab,
row covariance matrix A P Raa, and column covariance matrix B P Rbb. Conse-
quently, the row covariance matrix IND models the relationship between user latent
features while the column covariance matrix Ω captures the relationships between
different U k terms.
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The log-posterior over
 
U k
(
and
 
V k
(
is then given by:
log p
 
U k
(
,
 
V k
(   Rk( ,σ,λ,η,Ω	

K¸
k1
1
2σ2k
N¸
i1
M¸
j1
Ikij
 
Rkij  pU ki qTV kj q
2

K¸
k1
1
2λ2k
N¸
i1
pU ki qTU ki 
K¸
k1
1
2η2k
M¸
j1
pV kj qTV kj
 1
2
K¸
k1

log σ2k
N¸
i1
M¸
j1
Ikij

 ND
2
K¸
k1
log λ2k

K¸
k1
MkD
2
log η2k 
1
2
trpUΩ1UT q  ND
2
log |Ω|   C.
Training the MCF model involves finding MAP estimates of
 
U k
(
and
 
V k
(
, and
MLE estimates of σ, λ, η, and Ω by minimizing the following objective function:
J
 
U k
(
,
 
V k
(   Rk( ,σ,λ,η,Ω	   log p U k( ,  V k(   Rk( ,σ,λ,η,Ω	.
The numerical routine used by Zhang et al. is an alternating method where the opti-
mization of each parameter is treated as a separate subproblem: the first derivative
of J with respect to a parameter is taken, set equal to 0, and then solved with re-
spect to that parameter. This process is then iterated through for each parameter
in the model and repeated until convergence. For more specific details on the MCF
model and estimation scheme, as well as an extension of MCF that incorporates a
link function, see their paper.
Due to the lack of a publicly available dataset with distinct domains, Zhang
et al. evaluated the performance of MCF using movie data from MovieLens and
defining domains via the movie genres (e.g., Action or Drama).3 On this constructed
dataset, MCF showed promising results: compared to the standard PMF model that
3 http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
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it extends, the MCF model was able to obtain a higher predictive accuracy (in terms
of RMSE) in every single domain.
3.3 Proposed Model
Whereas Zhang et al. (2010) introduced a multiple-domain extension of the standard
PMF model, in this section we propose a multiple-domain extension of the standard
BPMF model. Like MCF, we allow each domain k to have its own latent user feature
matrix U k and latent item feature matrix V k. Unlike MCF, however, we allow the
dimensionality Dk to vary across domains. This is potentially beneficial because
it allows us to alleviate overfitting by specifying a lower dimensionality in certain
domains. Therefore, U k P RDkN and V k P RDkMk , where once again column U ki
represents user i’s latent feature vector in domain k and column V kj represents item
j’s latent feature vector in domain k.
We begin by assuming the following likelihood over the observed ratings in the
kth domain:
ppRk|U k,V k, αkq 
N¹
i1
Mk¹
j1

N

Rkij|pU ki q
T
V kj , α
1
k
	Ikij
, (3.10)
where αk is a precision parameter for domain k. Although this likelihood is similar
to the one for MCF that was given in equation (3.9), notice that we adopt the BPMF
convention and parametrize the normal distribution using a precision term instead
of a variance term.
Then, like BPMF, we place the following hierarchical structure on the item feature
vectors in domains k  1, ..., K:
ppV k|mkV ,ΩkV q 
Mk¹
j1
N

V kj |mkV , pΩkV q
1
	
,
ppΦkV |Φk0q  NpmkV |mk0, pbk0ΩkV q1qWpΩkV |Ψk0, nk0q,
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where we have defined ΦkV 
 
mkV ,Ω
k
V
(
and Φk0 
 
mk0, n
k
0,Ψ
k
0
(
for each domain
k  1, ..., K. Notice that there are K different parameter sets for both ΦkV and Φk0,
and that they do not necessarily have to be equal across all of the domains. This
provides us with the flexibility to specify different prior beliefs across the different
domains if we so choose (e.g., perhaps we believe that movie preferences tend to be
more spread out than book preferences).
Next, recall that each user has K different latent feature vectors (one for each
domain). Ideally, we would like to share information amongst the K different feature
vectors belonging to the same user. To accomplish this, we propose first stacking the
K user feature matrices in a column-wise manner. This forms the stacked matrix
U P RpD1 ... DKqN as follows:
U 


U 1
U 2
...
UK

,
where the ith column U i is the column vector that arises had we stacked the latent
feature vectors of user i across all K domains. Notice that we have defined this
matrix U slightly differently than the one that was introduced in Section 3.2.4 for
the MCF model, which explains why the matrices have different dimensions.
In order to capture correlations among a user’s latent features (both within and
across domains), we place the following hierarchical structure over this stacked ma-
trix:
ppU |µU ,ΛUq 
N¹
i1
N
 
U i|µU , pΛUq1

,
ppΘU |Θ0q  NpµU |µ0, pβ0ΛUq1qWpΛU |W 0, ν0q, (3.11)
where we have once again defined ΘU  tµU ,ΛUu and Θ0  tµ0, ν0,W 0u. Notice
that unlike our item hyperparameters where we had K different sets (one for each
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domain), here there is only one set of user hyperparameters since users belong to all
domains.
Finally, observe that if there is only 1 domain in the dataset, then the proposed
model reduces down to the standard BPMF model.
3.3.1 Posterior Inference
Like BPMF, due to the ease of sampling from the full conditional distributions, we
opt for a Gibbs sampling algorithm in order to approximate the intractable predictive
distribution of rating Rkij that user i gives to item j in domain k.
The full conditional for V kj is straightforward, and it has virtually the same form
as the full conditional for item features in the standard BPMF model—we just need
to make the domain explicit. That is, for domains k  1, ..., K:
ppV kj |Rk,U k,ΦkV , αkq 9
N¹
i1

N

Rkij|pU ki q
T
V kj , α
1
k
	Ikij
N

V kj |mkV , pΩkV q
1
	
9 N

V kj |mk

j ,

Ωk

j
1

, (3.12)
where
Ωk

j  ΩkV   αk
N¸
i1

U ki
 
U ki
TIij
,
mk

j 

Ωk

j
1 
αk
N¸
i1

U kiR
k
ij
Iij  ΩkVmkV

.
And like the BPMF model, notice that the full conditional over the item latent
feature matrix V k for domain k factorizes:
ppV k|Rk,U ,ΦkV , αkq 
Mk¹
j1
ppV kj |Rk,U k,ΦkV , αkq.
Therefore, we can speed up the MCMC by sampling from the full conditional distri-
butions for item feature vectors within the same domain in parallel. In fact, because
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the full conditional distributions for items in different domains are also independent,
additional speedups can be obtained by sampling from all M item feature vector full
conditional distributions in parallel, regardless of their domain.
Similarly, the full conditional distributions for the item hyperparameters have
closed forms that are almost identical to their BPMF model counterparts. Once
again, we just need to make the domain explicit. For domains k  1, ..., K:
ppΦkV |V k,Φk0q 9 ppV k|mkV ,ΩkV qppΦkV |Ψk0q
9 NpmkV |mk

0 , pbk

0 Ω
k
V q1qW pΩkV |Φk

0 , n
k
0 q, (3.13)
where
mk

0 
bk0m
k
0  MkV¯ k
bk0  Mk
, bk

0  bk0  Mk, nk

0  nk0  Mk,

Ψk

0
1
  Ψk01  MkS¯k   bk0Mkbk0  Mk pmk0  V¯ kqpmk0  V¯ kqT ,
V¯
k  1
Mk
Mk¸
j1
V kj , S¯
k  1
Mk
Mk¸
j1
pV kj  V¯ kqpV j  V¯ kqT .
And because the full conditionals for these item hyperparameters ΦkV are independent
of each other for all domains k, they can also be sampled in parallel in order to speed
up the MCMC.
On the other hand, the full conditional distribution for user i’s feature vector U ki
is not as straightforward as the BPMF case since his preferences in domain k are
now related to his preferences in all of the other domains, which we will denote as
Uki . Observe, however, that if we let ΣU  pΛUq1 be the corresponding covariance
matrix for the multivariate normal prior that was placed on the stacked vector U i
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in equation (3.11), then we can partition this prior distribution as follows:
ppU i|µU ,ΛUq  N
 
U i|µU , pΛUq1

 N pU i|µU ,ΣUq
 N

µU
k
µU
k


,

ΣU
k,k ΣU
k,k
ΣU
k,k ΣU
k,k


.


Therefore, using the properties of multivariate normal distributions, the prior
distribution in (3.11) elicits the following multivariate normal distribution for U ki
conditional on Uki (i.e., user i’s latent features in domain k conditional on his
latent features in all of the other domains):
ppU ki |Uki ,µU ,ΛUq  N

U ki |µˆkU ,

Λˆ
k
U
1

, (3.14)
where
µˆkU  µUk  ΣUk,k
 
ΣU
k,k
1 pUki  µUkq,
Λˆ
k
U 

ΣU
k,k ΣUk,k
 
ΣU
k,k
1
ΣU
k,k
1
.
Using equation (3.14), we can now derive the full conditional distribution for the
vector U ki . For domains k  1, ..., K:
ppU ki |Rk,V k,Uki ,ΘU , αkq 9
Mk¹
j1

NpRkij|pU ki qTV kj , α1k q
Ikij N U ki |µˆkU , ΛˆkU1


9 N

U ki |µk

i ,

Λk

i
1

, (3.15)
where
Λk

i  Λˆ
k
U   αk
Mk¸
j1

V kj
 
V kj
TIij
,
µk

i 

Λk

i
1 
αk
Mk¸
j1

V kjR
k
ij
Iij   ΛˆkU µˆkU

.
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Therefore, to sample a new stacked latent feature vector for user i, we simply have
to sample from the full conditional for his latent preferences U ki in every domain
k  1, ..., K. And although a user’s feature vectors in different domains cannot be
sampled in parallel, the feature vectors for different users within each domain k can
be sampled in parallel in order to speed up the MCMC.
Finally, the full conditional distribution over the user feature vector hyperparam-
eters is given by the following Gaussian-Wishart distribution:
ppΘU |U ,Θ0q 9 ppU |µU ,ΛUqppΘU |Θ0q
9 NpµU |µ0 , pβ0 ΛUq1qW pΛU |W 0 , ν0 q, (3.16)
where
µ0 
β0µ0  NU¯
β0  N , β

0  β0  N, ν0  ν0  N,
rW 0s1 W10  N S¯  
β0N
β0  N pµ0  U¯qpµ0  U¯q
T ,
U¯  1
N
N¸
i1
U i, S¯  1
N
N¸
i1
pU i  U¯qpU i  U¯qT .
90
Therefore, the Gibbs sampling scheme for our proposed model proceeds as follows:
Gibbs Sampling for the Proposed Model
1. Initialize the model parameters
 
U k
(1
and
 
V k
(1
at some values.
2. For iterations t  1, ..., T :
• In parallel, sample the hyperparameters from their full conditional
distributions given in equations (3.13) and (3.16):
pΦkV q
t  ppΦkV |
 
V k
t
,Φk0q for each domain k  1, ..., K,
pΘUqt  ppΘU | pUqt ,Θ0q.
• For each domain k  1, ..., K:
– In parallel, sample the feature vector for item j  1, ...,Mk from
its full conditional distribution given in equation (3.12): 
V kj
t 1  ppV kj |Rk,  U kt ,  ΦkV t , αkq.
– In parallel, sample the feature vector for user i  1, ..., N from his
full conditional distribution given in equation (3.15): 
U ki
t 1  ppU ki |Rk,  V kt 1 , pUki qt, pΘUqt, αkq,
where pUki q
t   pU 1i qt 1, ..., pU k1i qt 1, pU k 1i qt, ..., pUKi qt.
3.4 Experiments
One of the biggest obstacles to research in cross-domain recommender systems has
been the lack of a publicly available dataset with distinct domains. For this reason,
we use movie ratings from the MovieLens 100K dataset and create domains based
upon the movie genres. Although not ideal, this specific dataset and approach has
been used previously in the emerging cross-domain literature.
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In its original form, the MovieLens 100K dataset consists of 100,000 ratings from
943 users on 1682 movies.4 Movies can fall into 19 genres (including an “unknown”
genre), and they can belong to several different genres at once (e.g., an action-comedy
movie).
We compared the following models in a multiple-domain setting at various levels
of the latent dimensionality D:
• Multi-Domain Collaborative Filtering (MCF): This is the model pro-
posed by Zhang et al. (2010). For this model, the only parameter that needs
to be explicitly set is the latent dimensionality D; the other parameters were
found via the alternating method described in Section 3.2.4.
• Independent BPMF (BPMF-I): This is the standard BPMF model learned
separately on each domain with latent dimensionality D. Following Salakhut-
dinov and Mnih (2008b), in each domain we set µ0  m0  0, ν0  n0  D,
W 0  Φ0  ID, and we fixed the observation noise precision at α  2.
• Pooled BPMF (BPMF-P): This is the standard BPMF model learned with
latent dimensionality D after pooling all of the data into a single domain. The
same hyperparameter values as BPMF-I were used.
• Multi-Domain BPMF (BPMF-MD): This is the proposed model that gen-
eralizes the standard BPMF model to multiple domains. For this model, we
tried to set the hyperparameters to values that were comparable to the ones set
in the BPMF-I and BPMF-P models described above. Therefore, we restricted
our attention to the situation where the latent feature dimension is the same
in all domains (i.e., Dk  D for all k). In addition, we set the user hyper-
parameters as µ0  0, ν0  KD, and W 0  IKD. Meanwhile, for the item
4 http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
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hyperparameters we use mk0  0, nk0  D, and Φk0  ID for all domains k.
Finally, for all domains k the observation noise precision was fixed at αk  2.
In our experiments, each model was learned for latent dimensions D  1, 2, ..., 20.
Notice that for any fixed D, every model’s rating prediction is computed through
the inner product of two D dimensional vectors.
The code used to learn the MCF and the standard BPMF models were provided
by the authors. Finally, notice that the BPMF-I and BPMF-P models can be looked
at as two “naive” ways of handling the multiple-domain setting.
3.4.1 Cross-Domain Recommendations
In order to evaluate the performance of the models in a cross-domain situation, we
first wanted to construct a dataset with domains that were as distinct as possible—
which would typically be the case in a truly multiple-domain setting.5
To accomplish this, we first determined the subset of movies in our dataset that
fell uniquely into any one genre, leaving us with 831 movies. Of these movies, the
five genres with the most ratings were Drama, Comedy, Horror, Thriller, and Action.
We then further reduced our dataset to the movies that fell distinctly into one of
these five genres. A summary of this constructed dataset appears in Table 3.1.
Next, we randomly selected 80% of the ratings as the training set while the
remaining 20% was used as the test set. Each model’s overall performance on this
test set (in terms of RMSE) for varying levels of the latent feature dimensionality
D is shown in Fig. 3.4.1. From this figure, we see that the performance of the
Bayesian models continues to improve as the feature dimensionality grows. The
MAP-trained MCF model, however, starts to heavily overfit as D gets too large.
These results are consistent with the findings in Salakhutdinov and Mnih (2008b).
5 Consequently, the dataset we end up constructing differs from the one that Zhang et al. (2010)
consider.
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Table 3.1: Summary of the multiple-domain MovieLens data that we have con-
structed.
Action Comedy Drama Horror Thriller Total
Number of Movies 32 210 376 43 36 697
Number of Ratings 879 9828 13257 1558 1094 26616
Furthermore, we see that proposed BPMF-MD model outperforms every other model
for all values of D. In particular, by outperforming the BPMF-I and BPMF-P models
that naively handle the multiple-domain setting, the proposed BPMF-MD model
shows the promising future that cross-domain recommender systems hold.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of each model’s overall test RMSE in the cross-domain
recommendation situation for different levels of the latent feature dimensionality
D. Notice that the performance of the Bayesian models continues to improve as D
increases, but the MAP-trained MCF model begins to overfit. Finally, observe that
the proposed BPMF-MD model outperforms every other model for all values of D.
Finally, Table 3.2 provides a more detailed look at each model’s best overall
performance and the feature dimensionality under which it occurred. Interestingly,
although BPMF-MD outperforms BPMF-P overall, it does perform slightly worse
on some domains.
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Table 3.2: Breakdown of each method’s best RMSE scores and the feature dimen-
sionality under which it occurred in the cross-domain recommendation situation.
Model D Action Comedy Drama Horror Thriller Total
MCF 14 1.0200 1.0338 0.9649 1.0026 0.9211 0.9931
BPMF-I 20 0.9732 1.0025 0.9008 0.9675 0.9507 0.9477
BPMF-P 20 0.9632 0.9782 0.8974 0.9673 0.8652 0.9317
BPMF-MD 20 0.9600 0.9803 0.8905 0.9474 0.8807 0.9297
3.4.2 Semi-cold-start Recommendations
Cross-domain recommender systems may also be useful in addressing the semi-cold-
start problem. As defined in Winoto and Tang (2008), the semi-cold-start problem
occurs when the recommender system has ratings from a group of users on one do-
main (e.g., movies), but does not have their ratings in a different target domain
(e.g., music).6 Therefore, the goal of the recommender system is to leverage the
information that it has available to improve predictions in the target domain. From
a business perspective, these semi-cold-start recommendations can be used to pro-
vide a serendipitous aspect to the recommender system that can help improve user
experience by suggesting novel products that they do not expect, but might still
enjoy.
To simulate this situation, we considered the ratings from the largest two domains
(drama and comedy) of the dataset that we constructed in the previous example.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, this left us with 23,085 ratings from 942 users on
586 movies. We then randomly selected 150 users, placing all of their drama ratings
in the training set and all of their comedy ratings in the test set. Afterwards, we
randomly selected 150 different user, putting all of their drama ratings in the test set
and all of their comedy ratings in the training set. Finally, the drama and comedy
ratings for all of the other users was placed in the training set.
6 The recommender system is also assumed to have a group of users with ratings in both domains
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Fig. 3.4.2 shows the overall performance of the models on the test set (in terms
of RMSE) under varying levels of the latent feature dimensionality D. As in the
previous example, we see that the performance of the Bayesian models improves as
D increases, while the MAP-trained MCF model begins to overfit. And once again,
we see that the proposed BPMF-MD model continues to outperform the other models
at all levels of D.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of each model’s overall test RMSE in the semi-cold-start
recommendation situation for different levels of the latent feature dimensionality
D. Once again, the performance of the Bayesian models continues to improve as
D increases, while the MAP-trained MCF model begins to overfit. And like the
previous example, the proposed BPMF-MD model outperforms every other model
for all values of D.
Finally, Table 3.3 presents a more detailed look at each model’s best overall
performance and the feature dimensionality under which it occurred. This time we
see that the proposed BPMF-MD model performs the best in all domains.
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Table 3.3: Breakdown of each method’s best RMSE scores and the feature dimen-
sionality that it occurred under in the semi-cold-start recommendation situation.
Model D Comedy Drama Total
MCF 8 1.1221 1.0933 1.1045
BPMF-I 20 1.0353 1.0969 1.0737
BPMF-P 20 1.0126 0.9583 0.9795
BPMF-MD 20 0.9953 0.9552 0.9713
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a multiple-domain extension of the BPMF model that
was first introduced by Salakhutdinov and Mnih (2008b). Afterwards, we showed
that the proposed model outperforms other similar linear-factor based models in two
different cross-domain recommendation situations, which were created by partition-
ing a movie dataset into separate domains based upon movie genres. Consequently,
although a major obstacle to research in this area has been the lack of a publicly
available multiple-domain dataset, our results highlight the promising future that
cross-domain recommender systems holds.
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4Text Mining: A Trayvon Martin and Political Blogs
Case Study
4.1 Introduction
At its core, computational advertising is about deciding which online ad would be
best to display to any given user. One element that often influences this decision
is the textual information on the websites that a user is browsing. Consequently,
although it was originally developed in the 1980s, text mining has found new life in
this past decade. Indeed, many of its recent advances are directly attributable to the
rise of the Internet and the emergence of computational advertising. In this chapter,
we discuss some of the tools and challenges of text mining. In particular, we use the
Trayvon Martin shooting incident as a case study in analyzing the lexical content
and network connectivity structure of the political blogosphere.
Although the Trayvon Martin event and the set of websites that we investigate
are not necessarily aligned with computational advertising, the tools that we use
can be applied more broadly in order to better understand consumer preferences,
and to track how online content evolves over time. Indeed, a growing front in com-
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putational advertising seeks to use text mining and network analysis to help select
relevant online ads. For example, a user searching for the phrase “cars” could either
be interested in purchasing a new vehicle or in buying a new DVD. Here the lexical
content of a user’s recently traversed web pages—whether related to vehicles or ani-
mated films—can be used to help decide which advertisement would be most suitable
to display. Furthermore, emerging online trends—such as a viral car review (e.g., the
controversial review of the Tesla Model S that appeared in the New York Times) or
a renewed interest in Disney movies—can be used to select the best advertisement
for a user with a sparser browsing history, or to identify influential web properties
that may be particularly worthwhile to include in advertising campaigns.
Because it will be referenced extensively throughout this chapter, we begin by
reviewing the Trayvon Martin incident in more detail in Section 4.2. Afterwards,
Section 4.3 discusses how the data we use in this chapter was collected, what infor-
mation the data contains, and what issues of data quality exist. Section 4.4 then
presents the results of our data analysis. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Trayvon Martin Shooting Incident
The Trayvon Martin shooting was a recent event that ignited protests across the
United States, and sparked national debate over issues such as racism, gun control,
media coverage, and statutory self-defense laws. This section briefly reviews this
incident. For a more detailed overview, see the Wikipedia (2014) entry from which
much of this summary was derived.
4.2.1 The Shooting
On the rainy night of February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman (a 28 year old Hispanic
American neighborhood watchman) observed Trayvon Martin (a 17 year old African
American teenager) walking through his gated community in Sanford, Florida. Due
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to a recent series of break-ins in the neighborhood, and believing Martin to be acting
suspiciously, Zimmerman called the Sanford police non-emergency number to report
the activity. Shortly afterwards, Martin began running and Zimmerman promptly
followed. However, after he was told by the dispatcher to stop chasing after Martin,
Zimmerman ended his pursuit and awaited police assistance. At this point, the call
between Zimmerman and the dispatcher concluded.
Minutes later and before police arrived, however, a violent encounter between
Martin and Zimmerman took place, which resulted in Zimmerman fatally shooting
Martin. As it turns out, Martin was unarmed and had been temporarily staying in
the neighborhood with his father and his father’s fiance´e.
Upon arriving at the scene, police observed that Zimmerman was bleeding from
the nose and the back of his head. Upon questioning, Zimmerman admitted to
shooting Martin in self-defense—claiming that he had been attacked first, and that
he had yelled for help prior to discharging his firearm. Exactly whether it had been
Zimmerman or Martin that had been calling for help, however, has been the subject
of much debate and remains a mystery, with witnesses and experts offering conflicting
testimonies of what actually transpired.
Nevertheless, after a Sanford Police investigation, it was determined that there
was not enough evidence to dispute Zimmerman’s account of the event, and he was
not charged with any crime.
4.2.2 Media Coverage and Public Response
In the weeks following the incident, Zimmerman remained a free man and the case
received only local coverage. Starting in the beginning of March, however, efforts by
the Martin team eventually proved successful in garnering national attention—with
notable outlets such as Reuters, The Huffington Post, and CNN providing this early
coverage.
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Unfortunately, early reporting of the story was largely criticized for prematurely
influencing public opinion of the case, and some accused the media of trying to frame
the incident as a racially motivated killing and as a “Good vs. Evil” struggle. For
example, initial images of Martin were provided by his family, and depicted him as
a smiling teenager. In contrast, early images of Zimmerman were taken from his
2005 mugshot, and portrayed him as an unhappy and angry man. Furthermore,
initial reports characterized Zimmerman’s race as white, despite the fact that he had
personally identified himself as Hispanic on public documents such as his driver’s
license and voting records.
There were also issues with how the media presented Zimmerman’s phone con-
versation with the police dispatcher in the moments leading up to the incident. In
particular, NBC eventually was forced to apologize for mistakenly editing the call
in such a way that made it appear as if Zimmerman had racially profiled Martin
by readily volunteering the information that Martin was black. In reality, Zimmer-
man had provided this information only after the dispatcher specifically asked him
“is [Martin] black, white, or Hispanic?”, to which Zimmerman responded “He looks
black.”
Meanwhile, the Martin camp also objected to some aspects of the coverage, and
later blamed the media for running a smear campaign against Martin. For example,
Martin’s mother accused the media of “trying to kill [Trayvon’s] reputation” after it
was reported Martin had been serving a ten-day suspension for a marijuana incident
at the time of his death. Furthermore, Martin’s supporters also accused the media
of trying to portray Martin as a gangster after several pictures of drugs, guns, and
Martin making obscene gestures were released, while pictures of him dressed up for
prom, fishing with his father, and celebrating his birthday were not.
After the case exploded onto the national scene, protests were held across the
country calling for Zimmerman’s arrest—with hoodies (which Martin was wearing
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at the time of his death) being the most notable and extensively used rallying symbol.
Other popular symbols also included bags of Skittles and cans of Arizona Iced Tea,
which were items that Martin had reportedly purchased from a nearby convenience
store shortly before his death (although, in actuality, the beverage that Martin had
bought was a can of Arizona Watermelon Fruit Juice Cocktail).
Statements made by several prominent public figures and organizations also
served to further inflame the situation. Spike Lee, for example, accidentally forced
an elderly couple from their home when he erroneously identified their address as
Zimmerman’s in a public tweet. And when asked to give his thoughts on the inci-
dent, President Barack Obama famously commented “If I had a son, he would look
like Trayvon”—a remark for which he was both lauded and criticized.
The intense media coverage and public outcry eventually led to a reinvestigation
of the case. Finally, on April 11, 2012, and more than a month after the fatal shooting
actually occurred, Zimmerman was arrested and charged with second-degree murder.
4.2.3 Court Case and Statutory Self-Defense Laws
State prosecutors opened the case by filing an affidavit of probable cause: alleging
that Zimmerman had profiled, confronted, and fatally shot Martin even though he
had not been committing any crime. On the other hand, Zimmerman’s defense
team initially sought to have the charges dismissed based on Florida’s “stand your
ground” law, which permits someone to use deadly force—without requiring them
to first attempt to retreat—when he reasonably feels at risk of great bodily harm.
Ultimately, however, they decided to use “self-defense” as their official argument,
arguing that Zimmerman had not even had the opportunity to retreat as he was
being restrained by Martin at the time.
Finally, on July 13, 2013 the jury returned a verdict of not guilty for the charge
of second-degree murder, as well as for the lesser charge of manslaughter. Public
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response to the verdict was predictably mixed: Zimmerman’s supporters rejoiced
while his critics protested and called on the Department of Justice to intervene.
Furthermore, national polls found that the public reaction was sharply divided along
racial and political lines.
The Zimmerman trial also brought controversial “stand your ground” laws and
other statutory self-defense laws (e.g., the “castle doctrine,” which 46 states have
adopted) under intense national scrutiny. Supporters of these laws have argued that
they protect a necessary right, while their detractors have called them “shoot first”
laws that needlessly expand the definition of self-defense. Although these laws have
not yet been repealed, many are now under review to have their language clarified
in order to prevent such a situation from occurring again.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Collection
Justin Gross, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill provided us with a list of the top 1509 political blog domains
as ranked by Technorati as of January 13, 2013.1
Technorati is an Internet search engine that indexes over 100 million blog do-
mains that are broken down into several categories (e.g., politics, technology, busi-
ness, etc.). Technorati then computes a proprietary “Technorati Authority” metric
for each blog, which is a rating between 0 and 1000 (with 1000 being the highest)
measuring a domain’s “standing & influence in the blogosphere.” According to Tech-
norati’s Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),2 factors that contribute to this rating
include “linking behavior, categorization and other associated data over a short, fi-
nite period of time.” Consequently, a domain’s rating “may rapidly rise and fall
1 www.technorati.com
2 www.technorati.com/what-is-technorati-authority/
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depending on what the blogosphere is discussing at the moment, and how often a
site produces content being referenced by other sites.”
This list of political blog domains was then given to MaxPoint Interactive,3 a
startup technology company in the Research Triangle Area who agreed to scrape
and tokenize text from the blog entries that were posted on these domains between
January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012. While accessing and scraping the websites,
MaxPoint declared itself as a robot and followed each domain’s Robots Exclusion
Protocol (i.e., the set of instructions and guidelines that the site owners give to
any third-party robots). At the time of this chapter, the corpus contained 114,611
documents (i.e., individual blog entries) coming from 467 of the 1509 top ranked
political domains.
Due to the size of the corpus, as well as the desire to analyze the political blogo-
sphere with regards to a singular event, we decided to focus on the Trayvon Martin
shooting incident. There were several reasons for selecting this particular event over
others.4 First, coverage of the story was extremely prevalent and sustained through-
out the 2012 calendar year. Second, the incident was characterized by issues that
were particularly polarizing across the nation—such as the issues of racism and gun
control. Finally, it was thought that the uniqueness of the name “Trayvon” would
help to simplify the search for the documents that were relevant to the event: a doc-
ument referring to the shooting would almost surely contain the word “Trayvon,”
and it is unlikely that a document using the word “Trayvon” would be referring
to a different event. In the full corpus, 1103 documents coming from 145 different
domains mentioned the word “Trayvon” at least once.
3 www.maxpoint.com
4 Other events that we considered included the 2012 presidential election, the Benghazi terrorist
attack, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, and the Aurora movie theater shooting.
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4.3.2 Data Fields
After the raw HTML of a blog post has been scraped and parsed by MaxPoint, the
data fields associated with it are as follows:
• The name of the domain that the blog post appeared on.
• The estimated date on which the blog entry was posted.
• How the estimated date of the blog post was obtained.
• The raw text that was scraped from the blog post.
• The tokenized text that was obtained by using the Snowball stemmer (Porter,
2001) on the raw text.
• Any links to other domains that appeared in the blog post.
We now discuss each of these data fields in more detail.
The name of the domain that the blog post appeared on is simply a string iden-
tifying the unique organization or entity owning the entry (e.g., The Huffington Post
or Business Insider). In our dataset, these domains belong to one of the original
1509 top ranked political blog domains from Technorati that was provided to us by
Professor Gross. As mentioned previously, however, the full dataset (i.e., not just
the documents related to the Trayvon Martin incident) currently contains only 467
of these domains. This is a consequence of obstacles that have existed in scraping
some of these domains—for example the domain requested not to be scraped in their
Robots Exclusion Protocol, the domain had an unusual HTML structure that made
it particularly difficult to scrape and/or parse, etc.
Among the domains that were scraped, however, nuances in the HTML structure
made it challenging to obtain accurate timestamps for some of the blog entries.
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Consequently, MaxPoint attempted to estimate these dates via the following the
sequential search method:
1. URL: Check the URL to see whether a date is embedded there;
2. Body: Check the body of the blog post and take the first date found;
3. Global: Check the page as a whole and take the first date found.
Notice that this search method is prioritized in order of perceived accuracy. For each
document, both the date and the method used to acquire it were recorded.
The raw text of the blog post was also stored. Afterwards, MaxPoint employed
the Snowball stemmer (Porter, 2001) to trim inflected words to their root form.
This process, known as stemming and tokenizing the text, is statistically helpful
because it reduces the number of features (words) present in the data by removing
tense, pluralization, hyphenation, and other linguistic subtleties. For example, after
stemming and tokenization, words like “jump”, “jumps”, and “jumping” will all
be identified by the same token of “jump.”. According to studies done by the Text
REtrieval Conference (TREC) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) (such as Robertson et al. (2000)), simple stemming rules can adequately
handle approximately 85% of cases, with further improvement requiring case-by-case
handling.
Finally, any links to other domains that appeared in the blog entry were also
recorded.
4.3.3 Data Quality and Data Cleaning
Due to the sheer number of domains being analyzed, considerable differences existed
in the HTML codes that were being scraped. This made it particularly difficult to
parse the data in a consistent manner, leading to some data quality challenges that
we discuss in this subsection.
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Because blog entries coming from the same domain tended to have a similar
HTML structure, the types of errors being committed were thought to be highly
correlated among documents coming from the same domain. Consequently, a random
sample of 145 entries (one from each unique domain mentioning “Trayvon”) were
hand-checked by undergraduate majors in political science for any errors in document
content, dates, etc. Their results were then used to help identify and clean any data
quality issues that were discovered (e.g., by including domain-specific rules for the
parser to follow).
One of the major challenges in parsing the data involved difficulties in determining
which part of the scraped HTML actually corresponded to the blog post’s entry.
Specifically, errors fell into one of three categories: discarding parts of the actual
blog entry, including elements that were not part of the actual blog entry (e.g.,
reader comments), or identifying an erroneous part of the page as being the blog
entry. The second and third issues were particularly problematic as they introduced
a considerable amount of noise into the data—such as discussions occurring that are
not directly related to the blog entry, advertisements by “spambots,” new vocabulary
resulting from linguistic oddities in the reader comments , etc.
Another data quality issue that was identified involved the sequential search
method that was employed to estimate the document timestamps. For example,
consider Fig. 4.1, which shows a histogram of the timestamps for all of the docu-
ments in the Trayvon Martin corpus. Notice that two of the documents have been
dated as February 2, 2012 and February 26, 2012—highly suspect, as these times-
tamps correspond to dates that occur on or before the actual shooting, which is
represented in the figure by a vertical dotted line. Upon closer inspection, it was
observed that these two erroneous timestamps were obtained from the body of the
blog entry (i.e., the second step in the sequential search method). Specifically, one of
the documents references an earlier call made by Zimmerman to the police regard-
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ing suspicious activity that occurred on February 2 while the other document cites
February 26 as the actual day of the fatal shooting.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of the estimated timestamps for the documents in the
Trayvon Martin corpus, where the vertical dotted line corresponds to February 26,
2012 (the date the shooting actually occurred). Notice that two of the documents
have been dated before the actual incident occurred, which is clearly an error com-
mitted by the sequential search method.
In total, approximately 15% of the posts were found to be problematic to some
degree. Although some adjustments were made to how the data was processed, issues
and errors still remain. However, because the tools that we apply are expected to be
able to cope with noisy data to some extent, we proceeded with our analysis.
4.4 Data Analysis
In this section we discuss the text mining tools that we applied to the Trayvon
Martin corpus. These tools allowed us to identify n-grams, infer document sentiment,
discover the abstract “topics” that are being discussed, and investigate the network
structure of the blogosphere.
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4.4.1 Multi-word Expressions: n-grams
The first goal of our analysis was to identify the important n-grams characterizing the
Trayvon Martin incident, which are the contiguous sequences of n tokens having an
unusually high probability of occurring together when compared to other sequences
of the same length. Traditionally, approaches to this problem have followed the
method introduced in Manning and Schu¨tze (1999), and are based on hypothesis
tests of a multinomial contingency table. These hypothesis tests, however, typically
introduce a bias because they test all n-grams of the same length simultaneously.
Blei and Lafferty (2009) recently proposed their turbo topics model in order to
address this issue. Although turbo topics was originally presented as an extension
of topic modeling that aids in the visualization of topics by identifying topic-specific
multi-word expressions, our application of the model assumed only a single topic.
This allowed us to identify n-grams for the entire Trayvon Martin corpus while still
maintaining the statistical properties and computational efficiency of their model.
Consequently, our discussion differs slightly from the one presented in their paper.
Turbo topics is based on a language model of arbitrary length expressions, and it
recursively uses distribution-free nested permutation tests in order to find significant
phrases. Specifically, given a corpus of N total words coming from a vocabulary
containing V distinct words, the log likelihood is given by:
log ppwq 
N¸
n1
log ppwn|w1, ..., wn1q. (4.1)
There are two extremes when considering this model. The first is to specify the
fully parametrized model containing a conditional distribution of words given each
possible history.5 Unfortunately, this approach is computationally intractable as it
requires specifying at least V N parameters, and there will typically not be enough
5 A word’s history are the words preceding it.
109
data to estimate these parameters. Meanwhile, the second extreme is to model each
word as being independent of its history, ppwn|w1, ..., wn1q  ppwnq. This model,
however, is incapable of capturing the dependencies between words.
Turbo topics is a compromise between these two extremes, and it attempts to
parametrize the full model by conditioning on word histories of varying lengths. This
is accomplished by “backing off” to models with smaller histories under certain con-
ditions, which is a procedure that was first introduced by Katz (1987). In order to
use this procedure to evaluate the likelihood in equation (4.1), we require a distribu-
tion over words that can be conditioned on an arbitrary history of previous words.
Let w1:n denote a length n history, and let Sw1:n be the set of words that are governed
by history-specific probabilities (e.g., if the history w1:n  “new”, then S“new2 might
be {“york”, “jersey”, “hampshire”, “mexico”}). This distribution is assumed to be:
ppwn 1|w1:nq 
"
piwn 1|w1:n if wn 1 P Sw1:n
γw1:nppwn 1|w2:nq otherwise, (4.2)
where the constant γw1:n ensures that the distribution sums to one,
γw1:n 
1°vPSw1:n piv|u
1°vPSw1:n ppv|w2:nq (4.3)
Intuitively, the turbo topics procedure then proceeds as follows:
1. Fix the order of the tokens in each document in the corpus
w1, w2, w3, w4, ...
2. Given a token w, run a hypothesis testing procedure to identify the tokens
w1 that are likely to precede or follow w. When the test is significant, this
results in either the n-gram pw1, wq or pw,w1q being created.
3. Repeat step 2 until no new significant tokens are added.
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In step 2, turbo topics uses a greedy recursive search algorithm to look for n-
grams. Specifically, turbo topics begins by assuming a basic unigram model. Then,
given some current model, it attempts to expand to a more complicated model by
trying to include the next most likely n-gram. When evaluating whether this n-gram
should be added to the current model, turbo topics computes the log likelihood ratio
under the current model both with and without the candidate n-gram. Afterwards,
it performs a hypothesis test. If this test is significant, then the n-gram is added
to the current model. This process is repeated until no new significant n-grams are
added.
The exact hypothesis test that is used in the turbo topics model is a recursive
permutation test. This test involves first randomly shuffling all of the words in such a
way that still retains the sequence of words that are currently modeled. This is done
in order to remove any spurious dependencies present in the data, while still retaining
the dependencies that are already assumed by the current model. Afterwards, the
log likelihood ratio described in the previous paragraph is computed for this shuffled
data. A shuffled log likelihood ratio less than the original ratio serves as evidence
that the the n-gram was significant. Conversely, a shuffled log likelihood ratio greater
than the original ratio is treated as evidence against. Repeating this process several
times and computing the proportion of shuffled ratios greater than the original ratio
provides a p-value. If this p-value is less than some specified threshold, then the
n-gram is added to the current model.
Unlike many other hypothesis tests, this permutation test does not rely on as-
sumptions about the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic—a particularly
desirable property in this sparse data setting. Furthermore, another advantage of
the recursive permutation tests used in turbo topics is that it tests each candidate
n-gram individually while still accounting for other n-grams that have already been
added to the model. This helps to avoid the bias that is introduced by some other
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Table 4.1: The most frequently used n-grams in the Trayvon Martin corpus that were
identified by the turbo topics model (table reproduced from Soriano et al. (2013)).
georg zimmerman trayvon martin self defens
year old dont know stand ground law
presid obama stand ground african american
look like unit state trayvon martin case
barack obama dont think law enforc
fox news hate crime civil right
methods that test all n-grams of the same length simultaneously.
To help illustrate this last point, suppose that the word “new” occurs 10, 000
times in the corpus, the word “york” follows it 6000 times, and the word “jersey”
follows it 2000 times. After adding “new york” as a bigram to the model, turbo
topics will then see the 2000 out of 4000 occurrences of “new jersey” as a very strong
signal of a bigram—and much stronger than the 2000 out of 10,000 occurrences of
“new jersey” had we not updated our model with “new york.”
Table 4.1 shows the most frequently used n-grams in the Trayvon Martin corpus
that were identified by the turbo topics model. Ideally, one would also like to be
able to map certain n-grams to the same token—for example “presid obama” and
“barack obama” both refer to President Barack Obama and should be treated as the
same. The Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) procedure described in Deerwester et al.
(1990) that aims to identify words with similar meanings (synonymy) and words with
multiple meanings (polysemy) provides one potential path forward, although we did
not explore this further in our analysis.
4.4.2 Sentiment Analysis and Word Usage
Often political blogs have an element of subjectivity. Sentiment analysis is one
method that attempts to classify a document’s polarity—whether the expressed opin-
ion is positive, negative, or neutral—by comparing the words in the document against
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a dictionary of scored terms. The dictionary used in our analysis of the Trayvon Mar-
tin corpus was the AFINN list proposed by Nielsen (2011), which scores 2477 terms
rated on a 5 to 5 scale (negation terms such as “not” flip the score). In order to be
consistent with the corpus, the Snowball stemmer was applied to this list of words.
Let dw be the number of occurrences of word w in our dictionary, where w has a
score of sw. The polarity of a document is then defined as:
polarity 
¸
w
dwsw¸
w
dw|sw|
P r1, 1s, (4.4)
so that polarity P r1, 1s. The more positive a document is, the closer its polarity
will be to 1. Similarly, the more negative a document is, the closer its polarity will
be to 1. Meanwhile, documents with a polarity near 0 are considered neutral.
When analyzing the Trayvon Martin corpus, however, inherently negative terms
such as “gun” and “kill” may not necessarily be indicative of a document’s polarity.
Therefore, terms like these were removed from the dictionary prior to any analysis.
Some of these removed words included:
arrest assault attack bullet confront
crime dead death defens die
gun fatal ignor injuri kill
killer manslaught murder punch shoot
The polarity of all the documents in the Trayvon Martin corpus appears in
Fig. 4.2, where we used .15 as the cutoffs for classifying documents as positive,
negative, or neutral. In the end 199 documents were classified as negative, 286
documents were classified as positive, and 618 were classified as neutral.
After classifying the documents, we investigated whether there were terms that
tended to appear more often in positive documents, and whether there were terms
that tended to appear more often in negative documents. This was done using
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of the polarity scores of the documents in the Trayvon
Martin corpus. Vertical dotted lines appear at .15, and indicate the cutoff points
used for classifying the documents as either positive, negative, or neutral.
a two-proportion z-test. Specifically, for each token in the corpus let pˆ  be the
proportion of positive documents containing that token, pˆ be the proportion of
negative documents containing that token, and pˆ be the pooled proportion of positive
and negative documents containing that token. The two-proportion z-statistic for
testing H0 : p   p is then given by:
z  pˆ   pˆb
pˆp1 pˆqp 1
n 
  1
n
q
. (4.5)
Terms that had z ¡ 1.96 were deemed to occur significantly more often in posi-
tive documents. Meanwhile, those that had z   1.96 were labeled as occurring
significantly more often in negative documents.
The wordclouds pictured in Fig. 4.3 help to illustrate how terms were used across
documents in the Trayvon Martin corpus. Notice that documents with a negative
sentiment seemed to focus on George Zimmerman, his actions, and their consequences
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(recall that words like “gun” and “kill” have already removed from the dictionary so
they do not carry a negative connotation prior to our analysis). Documents with a
positive sentiment are a bit harder to discern, but they tended to have terms that
focused on more national issues.6
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Figure 4.3: Wordclouds contrasting the usage of tokens across documents in the
Trayvon Martin corpus. Left Panel: Tokens appearing significantly more often in
negative documents. Right Panel: Tokens appearing significantly more often in
positive documents.
4.4.3 Topic Modeling and the Blogosphere
Topic modeling is a statistical method that attempts to discover abstract “topics”
that occur in a corpus of documents. The latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model
described in Blei et al. (2003) is perhaps the most popular implementation of topic
modeling that is currently in use.
LDA assumes that there is a fixed finite vocabulary of terms W  tw1, . . . , wV u.
Each document is made up of a set of terms D  td1, . . . , dnu where di PW , and the
6 Recall that the Trayvon Martin corpus was assembled by finding documents mentioning
“Trayvon” at least once. This includes documents that mention the incident in passing (e.g.,
an end of the year wrap-up), documents that erroneously included reader comments, etc.
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corpus is defined as the set of documents tD1, . . . , Dmu being analyzed. The goal
of LDA is to use the textual information in the corpus to represent the documents
in terms of a set of latent topics, which are modeled as unknown multinomial dis-
tributions over the vocabulary that need to be inferred from the data. Early LDA
assumed that the number of unknown latent topics is fixed at some integer K.
The data generating process for the basic LDA model can be described as follows:
1. For each topic k:
(a) Draw a vector of word proportions φk  DirV pαq. This determines
the relative “weights” of each term in topic k.
2. For each document Dj:
(a) Draw a vector of topic proportions θj  DirKpβq. This determines
the extent to which document Dj is composed of each of the K topics.
(b) For each word wi in document j:
i. Draw a topic assignment zi Multpθjq.
ii. Draw a word from the topic wi Multpφziq.
This generative process can be visually represented with the plate diagram in
Fig. 4.4, which depicts the conditional dependence structure among the random vari-
ables. Notice that the only observed data are the words coming from the documents
in the corpus.
The goal of LDA is to invert this generative model and find the posterior distri-
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Figure 4.4: The plate diagram for the basic LDA generative process (figure repro-
duced from Soriano et al. (2013)).
bution of the latent variables conditional on the documents:
ppθ1:m; z1:m,1:n;φ1:K |w1:m,1:n;α,βq 
ppθ1:m; z1:m;φ1:K |w1:m;α,βq»
φ1:K
»
θ1:m
¸
z1:m,1:n
ppθ1:m; z1:m;φ1:K |w1:m;α,βq
. (4.6)
Because the denominator is intractable, however, the solution requires Markov Chain
Monte Carlo or variational inference methods. For example, Blei et al. (2003) used
a variational Bayes approximation approach while Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) pro-
posed a collapsed Gibbs sampler that integrates out the θj and φk.
Besides the turbo topics model discussed in Section 4.4.1, there have also been
numerous extensions of topic modeling that have been proposed. For example, Blei
et al. (2004) proposed hierarchical LDA (hLDA) to join topics together in a hierarchy
using the nested Chinese restaurant process. A couple of years later, Blei and Lafferty
(2006) introduced a dynamic extension to topic models in order to help analyze and
visualize the time evolution of topics. Meanwhile, Blei and McAuliffe (2008) proposed
supervised LDA (sLDA) to jointly model the topics of a corpus and a response
variable that is associated with each document (e.g., movie ratings, website view
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counts, etc.). And more recently, Chang and Blei (2010) proposed the relational topic
model (RTM) to summarize a network of documents, predict links between them,
and predict words within them. Indeed, one of the strengths of topic modeling is
that it is highly modular, and the extensions mentioned are just some of the models
that an advertiser may be interested in.
For our Trayvon Martin corpus, the decision was made to fit the basic LDA
model with five latent topics after attempts to fit the more sophisticated LDA models
resulted in topics that were more difficult to interpret. The top 15 tokens in each
topic can be seen in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: The top 15 words in each topic found by LDA for our Trayvon Martin
dataset (Table reproduced from Soriano et al. (2013)).
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
money obama think georg zimmerman trayvon martin
log presid dont trayvon martin black
scream state comment polic white
donat law would law georg zimmerman
dave american even gun media
voic year peopl case news
perjuri alec like would sharpton
expert govern one self defens racial
bond gun make said year
paypal group get charg hoodi
owen republican thing prosecutor look
bail democrat know evid said
forens war use shot fox
omara nation point state death
websit legisl say shoot race
Impressionistically, Topic 1 appears to focus on the legal trial (O’Mara is Zim-
merman’s defense attorney, Owen is an audio technician who concluded that the
scream was not Zimmerman’s, Zimmerman’s PayPal account became a legal issue,
etc.) while Topic 2 seems to relate to the political aspects of the story (such as gun
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control and statutory self-defense laws). Meanwhile, Topic 3 looks like it absorbs
unspecific and ambiguous words—perhaps capturing the “blog structure” and the
social function of blogging. Topic 4 seems to house the facts regarding the incident.
Finally, Topic 5 reflects the racial aspect.
Next, from a dynamic network perspective, we wanted to investigate how the
interactions among the blog domains involved the four primary topics (excluding
Topic 3) identified by LDA. In addition, we wanted to study how real time events and
a domain’s political orientation and stature affected the behavior of the blogosphere.
The following figures are stills taken from a movie that we created in order to
show the evolution of the discourse among the 145 blog domains in the Trayvon
Martin corpus. Here the domains are represented as nodes, while the directed edges
indicate the direction of the reference: the edge originates from the domain being
referenced and points to the domain that is making the reference. The domains
are also grouped into separate arcs by political orientation, which were provided by
Professor Justin Gross—the top arc consists of the conservative domains, the lower
left arc is composed of the moderate domains, and the liberal domains are represented
in the lower right arc. Within each arc, domains are also further organized according
to their Technorati Authority, which we use as a measure of a domain’s stature within
the political blogosphere. Here the more influential domains have larger nodes that
are located closer to the center of their arcs. Finally, the colors of the nodes indicate
the LDA topic that was most dominant on the blog domain for that day.
The first still in Fig. 4.5 shows the state of the blogosphere on March 21, 2012.
Here we see that most blogs have not yet picked up on the Trayvon Martin incident,
and the few that have appear to be focusing mainly on the actual event details. This
is not too surprising, as the story had just started to become national news at this
time. We can observe, however, that the more authoritative blogs were instrumental
in garnering national attention to the incident: the majority of the domains that
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reported on the event lie in the center of the arcs, and most of the links appear to be
originating from these centers as well. Furthermore, we can also see that links are
more likely to appear amongst those holding similar political paradigms, although
the moderate blogs do appear to be more willing to cite those from both sides of the
political aisle.
Figure 4.5: Trayvon Martin Blogosphere on March 21, 2012 just as the incident
started to become national news (figure reproduced from Soriano et al. (2013)). Early
coverage of the story seems to be mostly focused on the actual details of the event,
and the more authoritative blogs appear to be driving the discussion.
The second still in Fig. 4.6 depicts the blogosphere on April 11, 2012, which is
the date that Zimmerman was arrested and charged with second degree murder. The
blogosphere is incredibly active, and the discussion appears to have shifted towards
the racial and political aspects of the story. Once again, the linking behavior suggests
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that the more authoritative blogs appear to be driving the discussion, with links still
more likely to occur along party lines—particularly amongst the Conservative blogs.
Figure 4.6: Trayvon Martin Blogosphere on April 11, 2012—the day that Zimmer-
man was finally charged and arrested (figure reproduced from Soriano et al. (2013)).
The discussion seems to have shifted towards the racial and political topics.
The final still in Fig. 4.7 is from May 17, 2012, the day that prosecutors first
publicly released evidence from the case (which included police and autopsy reports,
surveillance videos, and witness statements). Although the linking behavior remains
consistent with what we have already seen, interestingly the Zimmerman case itself
does not appear to dominate the blogosphere as one may expect. In fact, over the
course of the entire incident, we found that the legal case was rarely the main topic of
discussion. Perhaps this is because it is hard to disentangle the legal topic from the
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racial and political ones—which are arguably the topics that came to characterize
the incident, and were responsible for bring it to national prominence in the first
place.
Figure 4.7: Trayvon Martin Blogosphere on May 17, 2012 when prosecutors first
publicly released evidence from the case (figure reproduced from Soriano et al.
(2013)). Despite this fact, discussion still seems to be focused on the racial and
political aspects of the incident rather than the legal one.
4.5 Conclusions
Computational advertising is a rapidly emerging discipline, and text mining has been
one extremely important component that has fueled its growth. In this chapter, we
have explored some of the text mining tools that allow us to identify n-grams, infer
document sentiment, discover abstract topics, and investigate network structures.
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Unfortunately, as powerful as text mining is, it does have its limitations. As we have
documented, there are significant challenges that can occur when trying to assemble
and analyze a real dataset coming from websites.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that no single off-the-shelf solution
will meet the demands of every advertising campaign. Indeed, for the foreseeable
future, the most successful campaigns will be the ones that are able to effectively
incorporate human knowledge and product expertise alongside the insights that are
gained from applying statistical models.
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5Concluding Remarks
This thesis discussed three problems in computational advertising whose solutions
help to determine the “best” online ad to display to any given user.
Chapter 2 covered the topic of auctions, which is the mechanism that ad ex-
changes use to buy and sell online advertisements. In particular, we proposed the
Backwards Indifference Derivation (BID) algorithm to numerically approximate the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium bidding functions in an independent private value
first-price sealed-bid auction where bidders draw their types from continuous and
atomless distributions. The BID algorithm was motivated in part by the results
derived in Athey (2001), and proceeded by attempting to construct a sequence of
finite-action equilibria that converges to the continuum-action solution. Using nu-
merical examples, we showed that the BID algorithm produces solutions that are
consistent with economic theory, and afterwards we investigated how ad auctions
can be modified in order to generate more revenue.
Chapter 3 focused on the area of recommender systems, which can be used
to help identify the most cost-effective ad to display to users. We then proposed
a cross-domain recommender system that was a multiple-domain extension of the
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Bayesian Probabilistic Matrix Factorization model proposed by Salakhutdinov and
Mnih (2008b). Afterwards, we showed that the proposed model outperforms other
similar linear-factor based models in two different cross-domain recommendation
situations, which highlights the promising future that cross-domain recommender
systems holds.
Chapter 4 discussed some of the tools and challenges of text mining, a field which
can be used to better understand consumer preferences and track how online content
evolves over time. In particular, the Trayvon Martin shooting incident was used as
a case study in analyzing the lexical content and network connectivity structure of
the political blogosphere.
There are, of course, many other problems in the computational advertising space.
For example, despite advertisers’ best efforts, the vast majority of online ads do not
elicit a desired response (e.g., a click or a sale). Consequently, ad retargeting has
become one extremely important area of computational advertising research. On the
other hand, advertisers have also become wary of online ads that receive too many
responses, which may be the result of fraudulent activity (e.g., click fraud). This has
motivated research into identifying and combating this malicious activity, which is
just one example of a problem in computational advertising that is not necessarily
concerned with determining the “best” online ad to display.
New opportunities for computational advertising research have also been created
by recent advances in technology. The rapid growth of smartphones and tablets,
for instance, has opened up new research areas in the realm of mobile advertising,
such as location-based targeting and mobile game advertising. Meanwhile, startup
companies like Coursera and Snapchat continue to present fresh challenges as they
brainstorm new ways of generating revenue for their innovative products.
Indeed, one of the most exciting aspects of computational advertising has been
the breadth, depth, and impact of the problems being considered. Given how quickly
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technology emerges and develops, this is a characteristic of computational advertising
that is likely to continue.
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